A selfish non-atomic routing algorithm based on game theory

Authors:
Jun Tao;Ye Liu;Qingliang Wu
Affiliations:
Key Laboratory of Computer Networks and Information Integration of Ministry of Education, Southeast University, Nanjing;Key Laboratory of Computer Networks and Information Integration of Ministry of Education, Southeast University, Nanjing;Key Laboratory of Computer Networks and Information Integration of Ministry of Education, Southeast University, Nanjing
Venue:
ICNC'05 Proceedings of the First international conference on Advances in Natural Computation - Volume Part III
Year:
2005

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Abstract

To avoid the low efficiency in Internet routing, end users adopt many routing technologies, such as source routing and active routing. As the result of user's participation, these routing technologies possess selfish character. Firstly, selfish routing game model is put forward in the paper based on the discussion of selfish routing problem. And then, we discuss the existence and uniqueness of Nash Equilibrium Point. Moreover, atomic and non-atomic routing in game model is discussed. Finally, SRAG algorithm is simulated in the specific network environment. The results of simulation show the good routing results of SRAG. The feasibility and effectivity of the algorithm is suggested by the results of experiment.