Randomized algorithms
Power consumption in packet radio networks
Theoretical Computer Science
Ad hoc networking: an introduction
Ad hoc networking
A DoD perspective on mobile Ad hoc networks
Ad hoc networking
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ACM SIGACT News
Computers and Intractability: A Guide to the Theory of NP-Completeness
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An on-demand minimum energy routing protocol for a wireless ad hoc network
ACM SIGMOBILE Mobile Computing and Communications Review
Near-optimal network design with selfish agents
Proceedings of the thirty-fifth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Designing Networks for Selfish Users is Hard
FOCS '01 Proceedings of the 42nd IEEE symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Selfish routing
Proceedings of the 9th annual international conference on Mobile computing and networking
Stimulating cooperation in self-organizing mobile ad hoc networks
Mobile Networks and Applications
Proceedings of the 9th annual international conference on Mobile computing and networking
Market sharing games applied to content distribution in ad-hoc networks
Proceedings of the 5th ACM international symposium on Mobile ad hoc networking and computing
IPDPS '05 Proceedings of the 19th IEEE International Parallel and Distributed Processing Symposium (IPDPS'05) - Workshop 12 - Volume 13
Energy efficient communication in ad hoc networks from user's and designer's perspective
ACM SIGMOBILE Mobile Computing and Communications Review
When selfish meets evil: byzantine players in a virus inoculation game
Proceedings of the twenty-fifth annual ACM symposium on Principles of distributed computing
On the topologies formed by selfish peers
Proceedings of the twenty-fifth annual ACM symposium on Principles of distributed computing
Equilibria in topology control games for ad hoc networks
Mobile Networks and Applications
A framework for incentive compatible topology control in non-cooperative wireless multi-hop networks
DIWANS '06 Proceedings of the 2006 workshop on Dependability issues in wireless ad hoc networks and sensor networks
On designing collusion-resistant routing schemes for non-cooperative wireless ad hoc networks
Proceedings of the 13th annual ACM international conference on Mobile computing and networking
The COMMIT Protocol for Truthful and Cost-Efficient Routing in Ad Hoc Networks with Selfish Nodes
IEEE Transactions on Mobile Computing
A game-theoretic analysis of wireless access point selection by mobile users
Computer Communications
Local Two-Stage Myopic Dynamics for Network Formation Games
WINE '08 Proceedings of the 4th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics
Network Creation Games with Disconnected Equilibria
WINE '08 Proceedings of the 4th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics
Three Selfish Spanning Tree Games
WINE '08 Proceedings of the 4th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics
Who should pay for forwarding packets?
WINE'07 Proceedings of the 3rd international conference on Internet and network economics
A collusion-resistant routing scheme for noncooperative wireless ad hoc networks
IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking (TON)
Selfish service installation in networks
WINE'06 Proceedings of the Second international conference on Internet and Network Economics
Equilibria for broadcast range assignment games in ad-hoc networks
ADHOC-NOW'05 Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Ad-Hoc, Mobile, and Wireless Networks
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We study topology control problems in ad hoc networks, where network nodes get to choose their power levels in order to ensure desired connectivity properties. Unlike most other work on this topic, we assume that the network nodes are owned by different entities, whose only goal is to maximize their own utility that they get out of the network without considering the overall performance of the network. Game theory is the appropriate tool to study such selfish nodes: we define several topology control games in which the nodes need to choose power levels in order to connect to other nodes in the network to reach their communication partners while at the same time minimizing their costs. We study Nash equilibria and show that -- among the games we define -- these can only be guaranteed to exist if all network nodes are required to be connected to all other nodes (we call this the Strong Connectivity Game). We give asymptotically tight bounds for the worst case quality of a Nash equilibrium in the Strong Connectivity Game and we improve these bounds for randomly distributed nodes. We then study the computational complexity of finding Nash equilibria and show that a polynomial-time algorithm finds Nash equilibria whose costs are at most a factor 2 off the minimum cost possible; for a variation called Connectivity Game, where each node is only required to be connected (possibly via intermediate nodes) to a given set of nodes, we show that answering the question, if a Nash equilibrium exists, is NP-hard, if the network graph satisfies the triangle inequality. For a second game called Reachability Game, where each node tries to reach as many other nodes as possible, while minimizing its radius, we show that 1+o(1)-approximate Nash equilibria exist for randomly distributed nodes. Our work is a first step towards game-theoretic analyses of ad hoc networks.