Three Selfish Spanning Tree Games

Authors:
Laurent Gourvès;Jérôme Monnot
Affiliations:
CNRS, UMR 7024, Paris, France F-75775 and Université de Paris-Dauphine, LAMSADE, Paris, France F-75775;CNRS, UMR 7024, Paris, France F-75775 and Université de Paris-Dauphine, LAMSADE, Paris, France F-75775
Venue:
WINE '08 Proceedings of the 4th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics
Year:
2008

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Abstract

We study a problem in a network. The input is an edge-weightedgraph G = (V,E) such that V contains a specificsource node r. Everyv ∈ V ∖ {r} is an entitywhich wants to be connected to r either directly or via otherentities. The main question is how do the entities deviate from asocially optimal network if they are not monitored by a centralauthority. We provide theoretical bounds on the (strong) price ofanarchy of this game. In particular, three variants – each ofthem being motivated by a practical situation – arestudied.