Sharing the “cost” of multicast trees: an axiomatic analysis
IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking (TON)
Applications of approximation algorithms to cooperative games
STOC '01 Proceedings of the thirty-third annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Sharing the cost of multicast transmissions
Journal of Computer and System Sciences - Special issue on Internet algorithms
FOCS '02 Proceedings of the 43rd Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Near-optimal network design with selfish agents
Proceedings of the thirty-fifth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Proceedings of the twenty-second annual symposium on Principles of distributed computing
Group Strategyproof Mechanisms via Primal-Dual Algorithms
FOCS '03 Proceedings of the 44th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
The Price of Stability for Network Design with Fair Cost Allocation
FOCS '04 Proceedings of the 45th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Strategyproof cost-sharing mechanisms for set cover and facility location games
Decision Support Systems - Special issue: The fourth ACM conference on electronic commerce
The price of selfish behavior in bilateral network formation
Proceedings of the twenty-fourth annual ACM symposium on Principles of distributed computing
Non-cooperative multicast and facility location games
EC '06 Proceedings of the 7th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Network design with weighted players
Proceedings of the eighteenth annual ACM symposium on Parallelism in algorithms and architectures
Strong equilibrium in cost sharing connection games
Proceedings of the 8th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
SODA '07 Proceedings of the eighteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
STACS'99 Proceedings of the 16th annual conference on Theoretical aspects of computer science
On the price of stability for designing undirected networks with fair cost allocations
ICALP'06 Proceedings of the 33rd international conference on Automata, Languages and Programming - Volume Part I
MFCS'06 Proceedings of the 31st international conference on Mathematical Foundations of Computer Science
Approximate Strong Equilibrium in Job Scheduling Games
SAGT '08 Proceedings of the 1st International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory
Three Selfish Spanning Tree Games
WINE '08 Proceedings of the 4th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics
On Pure and (Approximate) Strong Equilibria of Facility Location Games
WINE '08 Proceedings of the 4th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics
An O( lognloglogn) upper bound on the price of stability for undirected Shapley network design games
Information Processing Letters
Improved Bounds for Facility Location Games with Fair Cost Allocation
COCOA '09 Proceedings of the 3rd International Conference on Combinatorial Optimization and Applications
Resource Management in Large Networks
Algorithmics of Large and Complex Networks
Strong and Pareto Price of Anarchy in Congestion Games
ICALP '09 Proceedings of the 36th International Colloquium on Automata, Languages and Programming: Part I
Proceedings of the twenty-second annual ACM symposium on Parallelism in algorithms and architectures
Socially-aware network design games
INFOCOM'10 Proceedings of the 29th conference on Information communications
Cost sharing and strategyproof mechanisms for set cover games
Journal of Combinatorial Optimization
Improved lower bounds on the price of stability of undirected network design games
SAGT'10 Proceedings of the Third international conference on Algorithmic game theory
A game theoretic analysis of network design with socially-aware users
Computer Networks: The International Journal of Computer and Telecommunications Networking
The price of anarchy in cooperative network creation games
ACM SIGecom Exchanges
A Nash bargaining solution for cooperative network formation games
NETWORKING'11 Proceedings of the 10th international IFIP TC 6 conference on Networking - Volume Part I
On the price of stability for undirected network design
WAOA'09 Proceedings of the 7th international conference on Approximation and Online Algorithms
Capacitated network design games
SAGT'12 Proceedings of the 5th international conference on Algorithmic Game Theory
Improved bounds on the price of stability in network cost sharing games
Proceedings of the fourteenth ACM conference on Electronic commerce
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We study network design games where n self-interested agents have to form a network by purchasing links from a given set of edges. We consider Shapley cost sharing mechanisms that split the cost of an edge in a fair manner among the agents using the edge. It is well known that the price of anarchy of these games is as high as n. Therefore, recent research has focused on evaluating the price of stability, i.e. the cost of the best Nash equilibrium relative to the social optimum. In this paper we investigate to which extent coordination among agents can improve the quality of solutions. We resort to the concept of strong Nash equilibria, which were introduced by Aumann and are resilient to deviations by coalitions of agents. We analyze the price of anarchy of strong Nash equilibria and develop lower and upper bounds for unweighted and weighted games in both directed and undirected graphs. These bounds are tight or nearly tight for many scenarios. It shows that using coordination, the price of anarchy drops from linear to logarithmic bounds. We complement these results by also proving the first super-constant lower bound on the price of stability of standard equilibria (without coordination) in undirected graphs. More specifically, we show a lower bound of Ω(log W/ log log W) for weighted games, where W is the total weight of all the agents. This almost matches the known upper bound of O(log W). Our results imply that, for most settings, the worst-case performance ratios of strong coordinated equilibria are essentially always as good as the performance ratios of the best equilibria achievable without coordination. These settings include unweighted games in directed graphs as well as weighted games in both directed and undirected graphs.