FOCS '02 Proceedings of the 43rd Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Selfish caching in distributed systems: a game-theoretic analysis
Proceedings of the twenty-third annual ACM symposium on Principles of distributed computing
The Price of Stability for Network Design with Fair Cost Allocation
FOCS '04 Proceedings of the 45th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Non-cooperative multicast and facility location games
EC '06 Proceedings of the 7th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Network design with weighted players
Proceedings of the eighteenth annual ACM symposium on Parallelism in algorithms and architectures
Strong equilibrium in cost sharing connection games
Proceedings of the 8th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
On the value of coordination in network design
Proceedings of the nineteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
STACS'99 Proceedings of the 16th annual conference on Theoretical aspects of computer science
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We study social cost losses in Facility Location games, where nselfish agents install facilities over a network and connect tothem, so as to forward their local demand (expressed by anon-negative weight per agent). Agents using the same facilityshare fairly its installation cost, but every agent paysindividually a (weighted) connection cost to the chosen location.We study the Price of Stability (PoS) of pure Nash equilibria andthe Price of Anarchy of strong equilibria (SPoA), that generalizepure equilibria by being resilient to coalitional deviations. Forunweighted agents on metric networks we prove upper and lowerbounds on PoS, while an O(ln n) upper bound implied by previouswork is tight for non-metric networks. We also prove a constantupper bound for the SPoA of metric networks when strong equilibriaexist. For the weighted game on general networks we prove existenceof e-approximate (e = 2.718...) strong equilibria andan upper bound of O(ln W) on SPoA (W is the sum of agents’weights), which becomes tight Θ(ln n) for unweightedagents.