Algorithms, games, and the internet
STOC '01 Proceedings of the thirty-third annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
The price of anarchy is independent of the network topology
STOC '02 Proceedings of the thiry-fourth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Tight bounds for worst-case equilibria
SODA '02 Proceedings of the thirteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
Near-optimal network design with selfish agents
Proceedings of the thirty-fifth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Proceedings of the twenty-second annual symposium on Principles of distributed computing
The Price of Stability for Network Design with Fair Cost Allocation
FOCS '04 Proceedings of the 45th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Topological Conditions for Uniqueness of Equilibrium in Networks
Mathematics of Operations Research
SODA '07 Proceedings of the eighteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
STACS'99 Proceedings of the 16th annual conference on Theoretical aspects of computer science
Strong and correlated strong equilibria in monotone congestion games
WINE'06 Proceedings of the Second international conference on Internet and Network Economics
Network formation games with local coalitions
Proceedings of the twenty-sixth annual ACM symposium on Principles of distributed computing
On the value of coordination in network design
Proceedings of the nineteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
Congestion Games with Linearly Independent Paths: Convergence Time and Price of Anarchy
SAGT '08 Proceedings of the 1st International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory
Approximate Strong Equilibrium in Job Scheduling Games
SAGT '08 Proceedings of the 1st International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory
The Network Game: Analyzing Network-Formation and Interaction Strategies in Tandem
WI-IAT '08 Proceedings of the 2008 IEEE/WIC/ACM International Conference on Web Intelligence and Intelligent Agent Technology - Volume 02
Conflicting Congestion Effects in Resource Allocation Games
WINE '08 Proceedings of the 4th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics
On Pure and (Approximate) Strong Equilibria of Facility Location Games
WINE '08 Proceedings of the 4th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics
Pricing traffic in a spanning network
Proceedings of the 10th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Improved Bounds for Facility Location Games with Fair Cost Allocation
COCOA '09 Proceedings of the 3rd International Conference on Combinatorial Optimization and Applications
Strong and Pareto Price of Anarchy in Congestion Games
ICALP '09 Proceedings of the 36th International Colloquium on Automata, Languages and Programming: Part I
When ignorance helps: Graphical multicast cost sharing games
Theoretical Computer Science
SAGT '09 Proceedings of the 2nd International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory
Price of Stability in Survivable Network Design
SAGT '09 Proceedings of the 2nd International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory
Approximate strong equilibrium in job scheduling games
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
Socially-aware network design games
INFOCOM'10 Proceedings of the 29th conference on Information communications
Structured coalitions in resource selection games
ACM Transactions on Intelligent Systems and Technology (TIST)
A game theoretic analysis of network design with socially-aware users
Computer Networks: The International Journal of Computer and Telecommunications Networking
On approximate nash equilibria in network design
WINE'10 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Internet and network economics
The complexity of equilibria in cost sharing games
WINE'10 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Internet and network economics
Strategic multiway cut and multicut games
WAOA'10 Proceedings of the 8th international conference on Approximation and online algorithms
A Nash bargaining solution for cooperative network formation games
NETWORKING'11 Proceedings of the 10th international IFIP TC 6 conference on Networking - Volume Part I
Proceedings of the 3rd Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference
The price of anarchy on uniformly related machines revisited
Information and Computation
On the impact of local taxes in a set cover game
SIROCCO'10 Proceedings of the 17th international conference on Structural Information and Communication Complexity
Efficiency analysis of load balancing games with and without activation costs
Journal of Scheduling
Conflicting Congestion Effects in Resource Allocation Games
Operations Research
Minimizing rosenthal potential in multicast games
ICALP'12 Proceedings of the 39th international colloquium conference on Automata, Languages, and Programming - Volume Part II
Capacitated network design games
SAGT'12 Proceedings of the 5th international conference on Algorithmic Game Theory
Improved bounds on the price of stability in network cost sharing games
Proceedings of the fourteenth ACM conference on Electronic commerce
On the verification and computation of strong nash equilibrium
Proceedings of the 2013 international conference on Autonomous agents and multi-agent systems
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In this work we study cost sharing connection games, where each player has a source and sink he would like to connect, and the cost of the edges is either shared equally (fair connection games) or in an arbitrary way (general connection games).We study the graph topologies that guarantee the existence of a strong equilibrium (where no coalition can improve the cost of eachof its members) regardless of the specific costs on the edges. Our main existence results are the following: (1) For a single source and sink we show that there is always a strong equilibrium (both for fair and general connection games). (2) For a single source multiple sinks we show that for a series parallel graph a strong equilibrium always exists (both for fair and general connection games). (3) For multi source and sink we show that an extension parallel graph always admits a strong equilibrium in fair connection games. As for the quality of the strong equilibrium we show that in any fair connection games the cost of a strong equilibrium is Θ(log n) from the optimal solution, where n is the number of players. (This should be contrasted with the Ω(n) price of anarchy for the same setting.) For single source general connection games and single source single sink fair connection games, we show that a strong equilibrium is always an optimal solution.