The Price of Stability for Network Design with Fair Cost Allocation
FOCS '04 Proceedings of the 45th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Strong equilibrium in cost sharing connection games
Proceedings of the 8th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Non-cooperative Cost Sharing Games Via Subsidies
SAGT '08 Proceedings of the 1st International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory
STACS'99 Proceedings of the 16th annual conference on Theoretical aspects of computer science
Strong and correlated strong equilibria in monotone congestion games
WINE'06 Proceedings of the Second international conference on Internet and Network Economics
LP-Based covering games with low price of anarchy
WINE'12 Proceedings of the 8th international conference on Internet and Network Economics
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Given a collection $\mathcal{C}$ of weighted subsets of a ground set $\mathcal{E}$, the set cover problem is to find a minimum weight subset of $\mathcal{C}$ which covers all elements of $\mathcal{E}$. We study a strategic game defined upon this classical optimization problem. Every element of $\mathcal{E}$ is a player which chooses one set of $\mathcal{C}$ where it appears. Following a public tax function, every player is charged a fraction of the weight of the set that it has selected. Our motivation is to design a tax function having the following features: it can be implemented in a distributed manner, existence of an equilibrium is guaranteed and the social cost for these equilibria is minimized.