A fast approximation algorithm for the multicovering problem
Discrete Applied Mathematics
Algorithmic Aspects of the Core of Combinatorial Optimization Games
Mathematics of Operations Research
Vertex cover might be hard to approximate to within 2-ε
Journal of Computer and System Sciences
Limitations of cross-monotonic cost-sharing schemes
ACM Transactions on Algorithms (TALG)
Non-cooperative Cost Sharing Games Via Subsidies
SAGT '08 Proceedings of the 1st International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory
Intrinsic robustness of the price of anarchy
Proceedings of the forty-first annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Multiplicative updates outperform generic no-regret learning in congestion games: extended abstract
Proceedings of the forty-first annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
ICALP '09 Proceedings of the 36th International Colloquium on Automata, Languages and Programming: Part I
Distributed and parallel algorithms for weighted vertex cover and other covering problems
Proceedings of the 28th ACM symposium on Principles of distributed computing
Mechanism design for set cover games with selfish element agents
Theoretical Computer Science
Strategyproof cost-sharing mechanisms for set cover and facility location games
Decision Support Systems - Special issue: The fourth ACM conference on electronic commerce
Submodular Function Minimization under Covering Constraints
FOCS '09 Proceedings of the 2009 50th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Non-cooperative facility location and covering games
Theoretical Computer Science
STACS'99 Proceedings of the 16th annual conference on Theoretical aspects of computer science
Core stability of vertex cover games
WINE'07 Proceedings of the 3rd international conference on Internet and network economics
Proceedings of the ACM SIGMETRICS international conference on Measurement and modeling of computer systems
Weighted congestion games: price of anarchy, universal worst-case examples, and tightness
ESA'10 Proceedings of the 18th annual European conference on Algorithms: Part II
No regret learning in oligopolies: cournot vs. bertrand
SAGT'10 Proceedings of the Third international conference on Algorithmic game theory
Coalition formation and price of anarchy in cournot oligopolies
WINE'10 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Internet and network economics
Beating the best Nash without regret
ACM SIGecom Exchanges
Competitive Cost Sharing with Economies of Scale
Algorithmica
Selfish service installation in networks
WINE'06 Proceedings of the Second international conference on Internet and Network Economics
Local smoothness and the price of anarchy in atomic splittable congestion games
Proceedings of the twenty-second annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete Algorithms
Cost sharing and strategyproof mechanisms for set cover games
STACS'05 Proceedings of the 22nd annual conference on Theoretical Aspects of Computer Science
On the impact of local taxes in a set cover game
SIROCCO'10 Proceedings of the 17th international conference on Structural Information and Communication Complexity
ESA'12 Proceedings of the 20th Annual European conference on Algorithms
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We design a new class of vertex and set cover games, where the price of anarchy bounds match the best known constant factor approximation guarantees for the centralized optimization problems for linear and also for submodular costs. This is in contrast to all previously studied covering games, where the price of anarchy grows linearly with the size of the game. Both the game design and the price of anarchy results are based on structural properties of the linear programming relaxations. For linear costs we also exhibit simple best-response dynamics that converge to Nash equilibria in linear time.