The egalitarian solution and reduced game properties in convex games
International Journal of Game Theory
Monotonicity of the core and value in dynamic cooperative games
International Journal of Game Theory
Combinatorial optimization games
SODA '97 Proceedings of the eighth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
Cooperative facility location games
SODA '00 Proceedings of the eleventh annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
Applications of approximation algorithms to cooperative games
STOC '01 Proceedings of the thirty-third annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Equitable cost allocations via primal-dual-type algorithms
STOC '02 Proceedings of the thiry-fourth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Approximation algorithms for facility location problems
Approximation algorithms for facility location problems
Group Strategyproof Mechanisms via Primal-Dual Algorithms
FOCS '03 Proceedings of the 44th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Cross-monotonic cost-sharing methods for connected facility location games
EC '04 Proceedings of the 5th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Limitations of cross-monotonic cost sharing schemes
SODA '05 Proceedings of the sixteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
A group-strategyproof mechanism for Steiner forests
SODA '05 Proceedings of the sixteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
Collusion-resistant mechanisms for single-parameter agents
SODA '05 Proceedings of the sixteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
From primal-dual to cost shares and back: a stronger LP relaxation for the steiner forest problem
ICALP'05 Proceedings of the 32nd international conference on Automata, Languages and Programming
The Power of Small Coalitions in Cost Sharing
WINE '08 Proceedings of the 4th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics
Quantifying inefficiency in cost-sharing mechanisms
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
Non-cooperative facility location and covering games
Theoretical Computer Science
A complete characterization of group-strategyproof mechanisms of cost-sharing
ESA'10 Proceedings of the 18th annual European conference on Algorithms: Part I
Strategic cooperation in cost sharing games
WINE'10 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Internet and network economics
Sampling and Cost-Sharing: Approximation Algorithms for Stochastic Optimization Problems
SIAM Journal on Computing
Black-box reductions for cost-sharing mechanism design
Proceedings of the twenty-third annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete Algorithms
Online cooperative cost sharing
CIAC'10 Proceedings of the 7th international conference on Algorithms and Complexity
Price of Correlations in Stochastic Optimization
Operations Research
LP-Based covering games with low price of anarchy
WINE'12 Proceedings of the 8th international conference on Internet and Network Economics
On budget-balanced group-strategyproof cost-sharing mechanisms
WINE'12 Proceedings of the 8th international conference on Internet and Network Economics
Cost-recovering bayesian algorithmic mechanism design
Proceedings of the fourteenth ACM conference on Electronic commerce
A cross-monotonic cost-sharing scheme for the concave facility location game
Journal of Global Optimization
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A cost-sharing scheme is a set of rules defining how to share the cost of a service (often computed by solving a combinatorial optimization problem) amongs serviced customers. A cost-sharing scheme is cross-monotonic if it satisfies the property that everyone is better off when the set of people who receive the service expands. In this article, we develop a novel technique for proving upper bounds on the budget-balance factor of cross-monotonic cost-sharing schemes or the worst-case ratio of recovered cost to total cost. We apply this technique to games defined, based on several combinatorial optimization problems, including the problems of edge cover, vertex cover, set cover, and metric facility location and, in each case, derive tight or nearly-tight bounds. In particular, we show that for the facility location game, there is no cross-monotonic cost-sharing scheme that recovers more than a third of the total cost. This result, together with a recent 1/3-budget-balanced cross-monotonic cost-sharing scheme of Pál and Tardos [2003] closes the gap for the facility location game. For the vertex cover and set cover games, we show that no cross-monotonic cost-sharing scheme can recover more than a O(n−1/3) and O(1/n) fraction of the total cost, respectively. Finally, we study the implications of our results on the existence of group-strategyproof mechanisms. We show that every group-strategyproof mechanism corresponds to a cost-sharing scheme that satisfies a condition weaker than cross-monotonicity. Using this, we prove that group-strategyproof mechanisms satisfying additional properties give rise to cross-monotonic cost-sharing schemes and therefore our upper bounds hold.