Group Strategyproof Mechanisms via Primal-Dual Algorithms

  • Authors:
  • Martin Pál;Éva Tardo

  • Affiliations:
  • -;-

  • Venue:
  • FOCS '03 Proceedings of the 44th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
  • Year:
  • 2003

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Abstract

We develop a general method for turning a primal-dual algorithm into a group strategyproof cost-sharing mechanism. We use our method to design approximately budget balanced cost sharing mechanisms for two NP-complete problems: metric facility location, and single source rentor-buy network design. Both mechanisms are competitive, group strategyproof and recover a constant fraction of the cost. For the facility location game our cost-sharing methodrecovers a 1/3rd of the total cost, while in the network design game the cost shares pay for a 1/15 fraction of the cost of the solution.