Survivable networks, linear programming relaxations and the parsimonious property
Mathematical Programming: Series A and B
When Trees Collide: An Approximation Algorithm for theGeneralized Steiner Problem on Networks
SIAM Journal on Computing
Applications of approximation algorithms to cooperative games
STOC '01 Proceedings of the thirty-third annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Fault-tolerant facility location
SODA '03 Proceedings of the fourteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
Group Strategyproof Mechanisms via Primal-Dual Algorithms
FOCS '03 Proceedings of the 44th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Limitations of cross-monotonic cost sharing schemes
SODA '05 Proceedings of the sixteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
A group-strategyproof mechanism for Steiner forests
SODA '05 Proceedings of the sixteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
New trade-offs in cost-sharing mechanisms
Proceedings of the thirty-eighth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Proceedings of the 8th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Optimal Efficiency Guarantees for Network Design Mechanisms
IPCO '07 Proceedings of the 12th international conference on Integer Programming and Combinatorial Optimization
Strategyproof cost-sharing mechanisms for set cover and facility location games
Decision Support Systems - Special issue: The fourth ACM conference on electronic commerce
Optimal cost-sharing mechanisms for steiner forest problems
WINE'06 Proceedings of the Second international conference on Internet and Network Economics
Online cooperative cost sharing
CIAC'10 Proceedings of the 7th international conference on Algorithms and Complexity
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In the context of general demandcost sharing, we present the first group-strategyproof mechanisms for the metric fault tolerant uncapacitated facility location problem. They are $(3 \ensuremath{L})$-budget-balanced and $(3 \ensuremath{L} \cdot (1 + \mathcal H_n))$-efficient, where $\ensuremath{L}$ is the maximum service level and nis the number of agents. These mechanisms generalize the seminal Moulin mechanismsfor binary demand. We also apply this approach to the generalized Steiner problem in networks.