Applications of approximation algorithms to cooperative games
STOC '01 Proceedings of the thirty-third annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Equitable cost allocations via primal-dual-type algorithms
STOC '02 Proceedings of the thiry-fourth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Sharing the cost of multicast transmissions
Journal of Computer and System Sciences - Special issue on Internet algorithms
Strategyproof cost-sharing mechanisms for set cover and facility location games
Proceedings of the 4th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Hardness results for multicast cost sharing
Theoretical Computer Science
Group Strategyproof Mechanisms via Primal-Dual Algorithms
FOCS '03 Proceedings of the 44th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Cross-monotonic cost-sharing methods for connected facility location games
EC '04 Proceedings of the 5th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
The Price of Stability for Network Design with Fair Cost Allocation
FOCS '04 Proceedings of the 45th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Limitations of cross-monotonic cost sharing schemes
SODA '05 Proceedings of the sixteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
A group-strategyproof mechanism for Steiner forests
SODA '05 Proceedings of the sixteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
Proceedings of the 8th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
An efficient cost-sharing mechanism for the prize-collecting Steiner forest problem
SODA '07 Proceedings of the eighteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
New efficiency results for makespan cost sharing
Information Processing Letters
Group-strategyproof cost sharing mechanisms for makespan and other scheduling problems
Theoretical Computer Science
Optimal Efficiency Guarantees for Network Design Mechanisms
IPCO '07 Proceedings of the 12th international conference on Integer Programming and Combinatorial Optimization
On the Approximability of Combinatorial Exchange Problems
SAGT '08 Proceedings of the 1st International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory
Singleton Acyclic Mechanisms and Their Applications to Scheduling Problems
SAGT '08 Proceedings of the 1st International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory
Is Shapley Cost Sharing Optimal?
SAGT '08 Proceedings of the 1st International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory
Group-Strategyproof Cost Sharing for Metric Fault Tolerant Facility Location
SAGT '08 Proceedings of the 1st International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory
The Power of Small Coalitions in Cost Sharing
WINE '08 Proceedings of the 4th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics
Quantifying inefficiency in cost-sharing mechanisms
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
Mechanism design for set cover games with selfish element agents
Theoretical Computer Science
Pseudonyms in Cost-Sharing Games
WINE '09 Proceedings of the 5th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics
Cost sharing methods for makespan and completion time scheduling
STACS'07 Proceedings of the 24th annual conference on Theoretical aspects of computer science
Pricing tree access networks with connected backbones
ESA'07 Proceedings of the 15th annual European conference on Algorithms
WINE'07 Proceedings of the 3rd international conference on Internet and network economics
Correlation robust stochastic optimization
SODA '10 Proceedings of the twenty-first annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete Algorithms
A complete characterization of group-strategyproof mechanisms of cost-sharing
ESA'10 Proceedings of the 18th annual European conference on Algorithms: Part I
Optimal cost-sharing mechanisms for steiner forest problems
WINE'06 Proceedings of the Second international conference on Internet and Network Economics
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A cost-sharing mechanism is a protocol that collects bids from a set of players, selects a subset of the players to receive a service (incurring a subset-dependent cost), and determines a price to charge each of these players. Three standard requirements for cost-sharing mechanisms are incentive compatibility, which states that players are motivated to bid their true valuation for the service; budget-balance, meaning that the prices charged should recover the cost incurred; and efficiency, which states that the cost incurred and the valuations of the players served should be traded off in an optimal way. These three goals have been known to be mutually incompatible for thirty years. As a result, nearly all work on cost-sharing mechanisms in the economics and theoretical computer science literatures has focused on achieving two of these goals while completely ignoring the third.We show that incentive-compatibility, budget-balance, and approximate efficiency are simultaneously achievable for a wide range of cost functions, where efficiency is measured using the social cost---the sum of the incurred service cost and the excluded valuations. In particular, we prove such guarantees for well-known mechanisms for all submodular cost functions and for the Steiner tree cost function. We also prove a generic, quantifiable trade-off between the objectives of efficiency and budget-balance in groupstrategyproof cost-sharing mechanisms.