Applications of approximation algorithms to cooperative games
STOC '01 Proceedings of the thirty-third annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
IPTPS '01 Revised Papers from the First International Workshop on Peer-to-Peer Systems
The sybil attack in sensor networks: analysis & defenses
Proceedings of the 3rd international symposium on Information processing in sensor networks
Free-riding and whitewashing in peer-to-peer systems
Proceedings of the ACM SIGCOMM workshop on Practice and theory of incentives in networked systems
Proceedings of the thirty-seventh annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Limitations of cross-monotonic cost sharing schemes
SODA '05 Proceedings of the sixteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
Collusion-resistant mechanisms for single-parameter agents
SODA '05 Proceedings of the sixteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
Sybilproof reputation mechanisms
Proceedings of the 2005 ACM SIGCOMM workshop on Economics of peer-to-peer systems
New trade-offs in cost-sharing mechanisms
Proceedings of the thirty-eighth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Proceedings of the 8th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Limited verification of identities to induce false-name-proofness
TARK '07 Proceedings of the 11th conference on Theoretical aspects of rationality and knowledge
A Group-Strategyproof Cost Sharing Mechanism for the Steiner Forest Game
SIAM Journal on Computing
Is Shapley Cost Sharing Optimal?
SAGT '08 Proceedings of the 1st International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory
Optimal false-name-proof voting rules with costly voting
AAAI'08 Proceedings of the 23rd national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
IJCAI'03 Proceedings of the 18th international joint conference on Artificial intelligence
WINE'07 Proceedings of the 3rd international conference on Internet and network economics
Extremal Combinatorics: With Applications in Computer Science
Extremal Combinatorics: With Applications in Computer Science
The algorithmic structure of group strategyproof budget-balanced cost-sharing mechanisms
STACS'06 Proceedings of the 23rd Annual conference on Theoretical Aspects of Computer Science
Fair cost-sharing methods for scheduling jobs on parallel machines
CIAC'06 Proceedings of the 6th Italian conference on Algorithms and Complexity
More powerful and simpler cost-sharing methods
WAOA'04 Proceedings of the Second international conference on Approximation and Online Algorithms
The power of two prices: beyond cross-monotonicity
MFCS'07 Proceedings of the 32nd international conference on Mathematical Foundations of Computer Science
False-name-proofness in facility location problem on the real line
WINE'10 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Internet and network economics
Sybil-proof mechanisms in query incentive networks
Proceedings of the fourteenth ACM conference on Electronic commerce
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This work initiates the study of cost-sharing mechanisms that, in addition to the usual incentive compatibility conditions, make it disadvantageous for the users to employ pseudonyms. We show that this is possible only if all serviced users pay the same price, which implies that such mechanisms do not exist even for certain subadditive cost functions. In practice, a user can increase her utility by lying in one way (misreport her willingness to pay) or another (misreport her identity). We prove also results for approximately budget-balanced mechanisms. Finally, we consider mechanisms that rely on some kind of "reputation" associated to the pseudonyms and show that they are provably better.