Quantifying inefficiency in cost-sharing mechanisms
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
When ignorance helps: Graphical multicast cost sharing games
Theoretical Computer Science
Pseudonyms in Cost-Sharing Games
WINE '09 Proceedings of the 5th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics
Strategic cooperation in cost sharing games
WINE'10 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Internet and network economics
Designing Network Protocols for Good Equilibria
SIAM Journal on Computing
Sampling and Cost-Sharing: Approximation Algorithms for Stochastic Optimization Problems
SIAM Journal on Computing
Black-box reductions for cost-sharing mechanism design
Proceedings of the twenty-third annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete Algorithms
On budget-balanced group-strategyproof cost-sharing mechanisms
WINE'12 Proceedings of the 8th international conference on Internet and Network Economics
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We consider a game-theoretical variant of the Steiner forest problem in which each player $j$, out of a set of $k$ players, strives to connect his terminal pair $(s_j, t_j)$ of vertices in an undirected, edge-weighted graph $G$. In this paper we show that a natural adaptation of the primal-dual Steiner forest algorithm of Agrawal, Klein, and Ravi [SIAM J. Comput., 24 (1995), pp. 445-456] yields a $2$-budget balanced and cross-monotonic cost sharing method for this game. We also present a negative result, arguing that no cross-monotonic cost sharing method can achieve a budget balance factor of less than $2$ for the Steiner tree game. This shows that our result is tight. Our algorithm gives rise to a new linear programming relaxation for the Steiner forest problem which we term the lifted-cut relaxation. We show that this new relaxation is stronger than the standard undirected cut relaxation for the Steiner forest problem.