Applications of approximation algorithms to cooperative games
STOC '01 Proceedings of the thirty-third annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Sharing the cost of multicast transmissions
Journal of Computer and System Sciences - Special issue on Internet algorithms
Graphical Models for Game Theory
UAI '01 Proceedings of the 17th Conference in Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence
Approximation and collusion in multicast cost sharing
Proceedings of the 4th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Near-optimal network design with selfish agents
Proceedings of the thirty-fifth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Truthful Mechanisms for One-Parameter Agents
FOCS '01 Proceedings of the 42nd IEEE symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Hardness results for multicast cost sharing
Theoretical Computer Science
Selfish load balancing and atomic congestion games
Proceedings of the sixteenth annual ACM symposium on Parallelism in algorithms and architectures
The Price of Stability for Network Design with Fair Cost Allocation
FOCS '04 Proceedings of the 45th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Non-cooperative multicast and facility location games
EC '06 Proceedings of the 7th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Network design with weighted players
Proceedings of the eighteenth annual ACM symposium on Parallelism in algorithms and architectures
Sharing the cost of multicast transmissions in wireless networks
Theoretical Computer Science
Strong equilibrium in cost sharing connection games
Proceedings of the 8th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Network formation games with local coalitions
Proceedings of the twenty-sixth annual ACM symposium on Principles of distributed computing
An efficient cost-sharing mechanism for the prize-collecting Steiner forest problem
SODA '07 Proceedings of the eighteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
Algorithmic Game Theory
Designing networks with good equilibria
Proceedings of the nineteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
A Group-Strategyproof Cost Sharing Mechanism for the Steiner Forest Game
SIAM Journal on Computing
Online multicast with egalitarian cost sharing
Proceedings of the twentieth annual symposium on Parallelism in algorithms and architectures
Graphical congestion games with linear latencies
Proceedings of the twentieth annual symposium on Parallelism in algorithms and architectures
On the Value of Coordination in Network Design
SIAM Journal on Computing
Selfish routing with oblivious users
SIROCCO'07 Proceedings of the 14th international conference on Structural information and communication complexity
STACS'99 Proceedings of the 16th annual conference on Theoretical aspects of computer science
The price of nash equilibria in multicast transmissions games
ISAAC'07 Proceedings of the 18th international conference on Algorithms and computation
On the price of stability for designing undirected networks with fair cost allocations
ICALP'06 Proceedings of the 33rd international conference on Automata, Languages and Programming - Volume Part I
Multicast transmissions in non-cooperative networks with a limited number of selfish moves
MFCS'06 Proceedings of the 31st international conference on Mathematical Foundations of Computer Science
Local and global price of anarchy of graphical games
Theoretical Computer Science
Social context congestion games
SIROCCO'11 Proceedings of the 18th international conference on Structural information and communication complexity
Social context congestion games
Theoretical Computer Science
Hi-index | 5.23 |
In non-cooperative games played on highly decentralized networks the assumption that each player knows the strategy adopted by any other player may be too optimistic or even infeasible. In such situations, the set of players of which each player knows the chosen strategy can be modeled by means of a social knowledge graph in which nodes represent players and there is an edge from i to j if i knows j. Following the framework introduced in [7], we study the impact of social knowledge graphs on the fundamental multicast cost sharing game in which all the players want to receive the same communication from a given source in an undirected network. In the classical complete information case, such a game is known to be highly inefficient, since its price of anarchy can be as high as the total number of players @r. We first show that, under our incomplete information setting, pure Nash equilibria always exist only if the social knowledge graph is directed acyclic (DAG). We then prove that the price of stability of any DAG is at least 12log@r and provide a DAG lowering the classical price of anarchy to a value between 12log@r and log^2@r. If specific instances of the game are concerned, that is if the social knowledge graph can be selected as a function of the instance, we show that the price of stability is at least 4@r@r+3, and that the same bound holds also for the price of anarchy of any social knowledge graph (not only DAGs). Moreover, we provide a nearly matching upper bound by proving that, for any fixed instance, there always exists a DAG yielding a price of anarchy less than 4. Our results open a new window on how the performances of non-cooperative systems may benefit from the lack of total knowledge among players.