Local and global price of anarchy of graphical games

Authors:
Oren Ben-Zwi;Amir Ronen
Affiliations:
Computer Science Department, Haifa University, Haifa, Israel;Machine Learning Group, IBM Haifa Research Lab, Israel
Venue:
Theoretical Computer Science
Year:
2011

Citing 14
Cited 0

Graphical Models for Game Theory

UAI '01 Proceedings of the 17th Conference in Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence
How bad is selfish routing?

FOCS '00 Proceedings of the 41st Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
The Price of Stability for Network Design with Fair Cost Allocation

FOCS '04 Proceedings of the 45th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
The Price of Routing Unsplittable Flow

Proceedings of the thirty-seventh annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
The complexity of computing a Nash equilibrium

Proceedings of the thirty-eighth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Nash equilibria in graphical games on trees revisited

EC '06 Proceedings of the 7th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Settling the Complexity of Two-Player Nash Equilibrium

FOCS '06 Proceedings of the 47th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Algorithmic Game Theory

Algorithmic Game Theory
Sparse partitions

SFCS '90 Proceedings of the 31st Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
When Ignorance Helps: Graphical Multicast Cost Sharing Games

MFCS '08 Proceedings of the 33rd international symposium on Mathematical Foundations of Computer Science
Graphical Congestion Games

WINE '08 Proceedings of the 4th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics
Equilibria and Efficiency Loss in Games on Networks

CSE '09 Proceedings of the 2009 International Conference on Computational Science and Engineering - Volume 04
When ignorance helps: Graphical multicast cost sharing games

Theoretical Computer Science
Worst-case equilibria

STACS'99 Proceedings of the 16th annual conference on Theoretical aspects of computer science

Quantified Score

Hi-index	5.23

Visualization

Abstract

This paper initiates a study of connections between local and global properties of graphical games. Specifically, we introduce a concept of local price of anarchy that quantifies how well subsets of agents respond to their environments. We then show several methods of bounding the global price of anarchy of a game in terms of the local price of anarchy. All our bounds are essentially tight.