Graphical Models for Game Theory
UAI '01 Proceedings of the 17th Conference in Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence
Computing equilibria for congestion games with (im)perfect information
SODA '04 Proceedings of the fifteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
The complexity of pure Nash equilibria
STOC '04 Proceedings of the thirty-sixth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
The Price of Routing Unsplittable Flow
Proceedings of the thirty-seventh annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
The price of anarchy of finite congestion games
Proceedings of the thirty-seventh annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Selfish routing with incomplete information
Proceedings of the seventeenth annual ACM symposium on Parallelism in algorithms and architectures
Network uncertainty in selfish routing
IPDPS'06 Proceedings of the 20th international conference on Parallel and distributed processing
On the price of anarchy and stability of correlated equilibria of linear congestion games,,
ESA'05 Proceedings of the 13th annual European conference on Algorithms
Price of anarchy of network routing games with incomplete information
WINE'05 Proceedings of the First international conference on Internet and Network Economics
Tight bounds for selfish and greedy load balancing
ICALP'06 Proceedings of the 33rd international conference on Automata, Languages and Programming - Volume Part I
Selfish load balancing under partial knowledge
MFCS'07 Proceedings of the 32nd international conference on Mathematical Foundations of Computer Science
The Impact of Social Ignorance on Weighted Congestion Games
WINE '09 Proceedings of the 5th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics
Local and global price of anarchy of graphical games
Theoretical Computer Science
Atomic congestion games on graphs and their applications in networking
IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking (TON)
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We consider congestion games with linear latency functions in which each player is aware only of a subset of all the other players. This is modeled by means of a social knowledge graph G in which nodes represent players and there is an edge from i to j if i knows j . Under the assumption that the payoff of each player is affected only by the strategies of the adjacent ones, we first give a complete characterization of the games possessing pure Nash equilibria. We then investigate the impact of the limited knowledge of the players on the performance of the game. More precisely, given a bound on the maximum degree of G , for the convergent cases we provide tight lower and upper bounds on the price of stability and asymptotically tight bounds on the price of anarchy. All the results are then extended to load balancing games.