Selfish load balancing under partial knowledge

Authors:
Elias Koutsoupias;Panagiota N. Panagopoulou;Paul G. Spirakis
Affiliations:
Department of Informatics and Telecommunications, University of Athens, Greece;Computer Engineering and Informatics Department, Patras University, Greece and Research Academic Computer Technology Institute, Greece;Computer Engineering and Informatics Department, Patras University, Greece and Research Academic Computer Technology Institute, Greece
Venue:
MFCS'07 Proceedings of the 32nd international conference on Mathematical Foundations of Computer Science
Year:
2007

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Abstract

We consider n selfish agents or players, each having a load, who want to place their loads to one of two bins. The agents have an incomplete picture of the world: They know some loads exactly and only a probability distribution for the rest. We study Nash equilibria for this model, we compute the Price of Anarchy for some cases and show that sometimes extra information adversely affects the Divergence Ratio (a kind of subjective Price of Anarchy).