STOC '01 Proceedings of the thirty-third annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Algorithms, games, and the internet
STOC '01 Proceedings of the thirty-third annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Tight bounds for worst-case equilibria
SODA '02 Proceedings of the thirteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
The Structure and Complexity of Nash Equilibria for a Selfish Routing Game
ICALP '02 Proceedings of the 29th International Colloquium on Automata, Languages and Programming
Computing equilibria for congestion games with (im)perfect information
SODA '04 Proceedings of the fifteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
The complexity of pure Nash equilibria
STOC '04 Proceedings of the thirty-sixth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Computing Nash equilibria for scheduling on restricted parallel links
STOC '04 Proceedings of the thirty-sixth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Preface: game theory meets theoretical computer science
Theoretical Computer Science - Game theory meets theoretical computer science
Nashification and the coordination ratio for a selfish routing game
ICALP'03 Proceedings of the 30th international conference on Automata, languages and programming
STACS'99 Proceedings of the 16th annual conference on Theoretical aspects of computer science
Routing games with an unknown set of active players
Proceedings of the 6th international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems
Graphical congestion games with linear latencies
Proceedings of the twentieth annual symposium on Parallelism in algorithms and architectures
Facets of the Fully Mixed Nash Equilibrium Conjecture
SAGT '08 Proceedings of the 1st International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory
WINE '08 Proceedings of the 4th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics
Learning equilibria in repeated congestion games
Proceedings of The 8th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 1
Two-terminal routing games with unknown active players
Artificial Intelligence
Learning equilibrium in resource selection games
AAAI'07 Proceedings of the 22nd national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
Tradeoffs and average-case equilibria in selfish routing
ESA'07 Proceedings of the 15th annual European conference on Algorithms
Total latency in singleton congestion games
WINE'07 Proceedings of the 3rd international conference on Internet and network economics
Bayesian algorithmic mechanism design
Proceedings of the forty-second ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Network uncertainty in selfish routing
IPDPS'06 Proceedings of the 20th international conference on Parallel and distributed processing
Price of anarchy for polynomial wardrop games
WINE'06 Proceedings of the Second international conference on Internet and Network Economics
Exact price of anarchy for polynomial congestion games
STACS'06 Proceedings of the 23rd Annual conference on Theoretical Aspects of Computer Science
Price of anarchy of network routing games with incomplete information
WINE'05 Proceedings of the First international conference on Internet and Network Economics
Routing (un-) splittable flow in games with player-specific linear latency functions
ICALP'06 Proceedings of the 33rd international conference on Automata, Languages and Programming - Volume Part I
Selfish load balancing under partial knowledge
MFCS'07 Proceedings of the 32nd international conference on Mathematical Foundations of Computer Science
Routing and scheduling with incomplete information
DISC'07 Proceedings of the 21st international conference on Distributed Computing
Risk sensitivity of price of anarchy under uncertainty
Proceedings of the fourteenth ACM conference on Electronic commerce
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In his seminal work Harsanyi [13] introduced an elegant approach to study non-cooperative games with incomplete information where the players are uncertain about some parameters. To model such games he introduced the Harsanyi transformation, which converts a game with incomplete information to a strategic game where players may have different types. In the resulting Bayesian game players' uncertainty about each others types is described by a probability distribution over all possible type profiles.In this work, we introduce a particular selfish routing game with incomplete information that we call Bayesian routing game. Here, n selfish users wish to assign their traffic to one of m links. Users do not know each others traffic. Following Harsanyi's approach, we introduce for each user a set of possible types.This paper presents a comprehensive collection of results for the Bayesian routing game.We prove, with help of a potential function, that every Bayesian routing game possesses a pure Bayesian Nash equilibrium. For the model of identical links and independent type distribution we give a polynomial time algorithm to compute a pure Bayesian Nash equilibrium.We study structural properties of fully mixed Bayesian Nash equilibria for the model of identical links and show that they maximize individual cost. In general there exists more than one fully mixed Bayesian Nash equilibrium. We characterize the class of fully mixed Bayesian Nash equilibria in the case of independent type distribution.We conclude with results on coordination ratio for the model of identical links for three social cost measures, that is, social cost as expected maximum congestion, sum of individual costs and maximum individual cost. For the latter two we are able to give (asymptotic) tight bounds using our results on fully mixed Bayesian Nash equilibria.To the best of our knowledge this is the first time that mixed Bayesian Nash equilibria have been studied in conjunction with social cost.