Two-terminal routing games with unknown active players

Authors:
Itai Ashlagi;Dov Monderer;Moshe Tennenholtz
Affiliations:
Harvard Business School, Harvard University, USA;Industrial Engineering & Management, Technion, Israel;Industrial Engineering & Management, Technion, Israel and Microsoft Israel R&D Center, Israel
Venue:
Artificial Intelligence
Year:
2009

Citing 11
Cited 3

Network flows: theory, algorithms, and applications

Network flows: theory, algorithms, and applications
Competitive routing in multiuser communication networks

IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking (TON)
The price of selfish routing

STOC '01 Proceedings of the thirty-third annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
How bad is selfish routing?

Journal of the ACM (JACM)
Selfish routing with incomplete information

Proceedings of the seventeenth annual ACM symposium on Parallelism in algorithms and architectures
Robust game theory

Mathematical Programming: Series A and B
Resource selection games with unknown number of players

AAMAS '06 Proceedings of the fifth international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems
Equilibria of atomic flow games are not unique

SODA '09 Proceedings of the twentieth Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms
Multipotential games

IJCAI'07 Proceedings of the 20th international joint conference on Artifical intelligence
Worst-case equilibria

STACS'99 Proceedings of the 16th annual conference on Theoretical aspects of computer science
Price of anarchy of network routing games with incomplete information

WINE'05 Proceedings of the First international conference on Internet and Network Economics

Bayesian ignorance

Proceedings of the 29th ACM SIGACT-SIGOPS symposium on Principles of distributed computing
Bayesian ignorance

Theoretical Computer Science
Cooperation among malicious agents: a general quantitative congestion game framework

Proceedings of the 11th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 3

Quantified Score

Hi-index	0.00

Visualization

Abstract

We analyze 2-terminal routing games with linear cost functions and with unknown number of active players. We deal with both splittable and unsplittable models. We prove the existence and uniqueness of a symmetric safety-level equilibrium in such games and show that in many cases every player benefits from the common ignorance about the number of players. Furthermore, we prove new theorems on existence and uniqueness of equilibrium in 2-terminal convex routing games with complete information.