UAI '00 Proceedings of the 16th Conference on Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence
Graphical Models for Game Theory
UAI '01 Proceedings of the 17th Conference in Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence
Multi-agent algorithms for solving graphical games
Eighteenth national conference on Artificial intelligence
Computing Nash equilibria of action-graph games
UAI '04 Proceedings of the 20th conference on Uncertainty in artificial intelligence
IJCAI'03 Proceedings of the 18th international joint conference on Artificial intelligence
Multi-agent influence diagrams for representing and solving games
IJCAI'01 Proceedings of the 17th international joint conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 2
Congestion games with load-dependent failures: identical resources
Proceedings of the 8th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Routing games with an unknown set of active players
Proceedings of the 6th international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems
On Satisfiability Games and the Power of Congestion Games
AAIM '07 Proceedings of the 3rd international conference on Algorithmic Aspects in Information and Management
Two-terminal routing games with unknown active players
Artificial Intelligence
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
Routing (un-) splittable flow in games with player-specific affine latency functions
ACM Transactions on Algorithms (TALG)
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We introduce and analyze q-potential games and q- congestion games, where q is a positive integer. A 1-potential (congestion) game is a potential (congestion) game. We show that a game is a q-potential game if and only if it is (up to an isomorphism) a q-congestion game. As a corollary, we derive the result that every game in strategic form is a q- congestion game for some q. It is further shown that every q-congestion game is isomorphic to a q- network game, where the network environment is defined by a directed graph with one origin and one destination. Finally we discuss our main agenda: The issue of representing q-congestion games with non-negative cost functions by congestion models with non-negative and monotonic facility cost functions. We provide some initial results in this regard.