Multiagent Reinforcement Learning: Theoretical Framework and an Algorithm
ICML '98 Proceedings of the Fifteenth International Conference on Machine Learning
UAI '00 Proceedings of the 16th Conference on Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence
Graphical Models for Game Theory
UAI '01 Proceedings of the 17th Conference in Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence
Multi-agent algorithms for solving graphical games
Eighteenth national conference on Artificial intelligence
A continuation method for Nash equilibria in structured games
IJCAI'03 Proceedings of the 18th international joint conference on Artificial intelligence
Multi-agent influence diagrams for representing and solving games
IJCAI'01 Proceedings of the 17th international joint conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 2
Efficient nash computation in large population games with bounded influence
UAI'02 Proceedings of the Eighteenth conference on Uncertainty in artificial intelligence
Computing approximate bayes-nash equilibria in tree-games of incomplete information
EC '04 Proceedings of the 5th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Communication complexity as a lower bound for learning in games
ICML '04 Proceedings of the twenty-first international conference on Machine learning
Computing Nash equilibria of action-graph games
UAI '04 Proceedings of the 20th conference on Uncertainty in artificial intelligence
Computing correlated equilibria in multi-player games
Proceedings of the thirty-seventh annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Complexity of (iterated) dominance
Proceedings of the 6th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Computing the optimal strategy to commit to
EC '06 Proceedings of the 7th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
A technique for reducing normal-form games to compute a Nash equilibrium
AAMAS '06 Proceedings of the fifth international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems
If multi-agent learning is the answer, what is the question?
Artificial Intelligence
Lossless abstraction of imperfect information games
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
Factoring games to isolate strategic interactions
Proceedings of the 6th international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems
Routing games with an unknown set of active players
Proceedings of the 6th international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems
Computer science and game theory
Communications of the ACM - Designing games with a purpose
Computing correlated equilibria in multi-player games
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
Compact preference representation and Boolean games
Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems
Symmetries and the complexity of pure Nash equilibrium
Journal of Computer and System Sciences
Dependencies between players in Boolean games
International Journal of Approximate Reasoning
On the complexity of constrained Nash equilibria in graphical games
Theoretical Computer Science
Methods for empirical game-theoretic analysis
AAAI'06 proceedings of the 21st national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 2
A polynomial-time algorithm for action-graph games
AAAI'06 Proceedings of the 21st national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
Fast and compact: a simple class of congestion games
AAAI'05 Proceedings of the 20th national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 2
Approximate strategic reasoning through hierarchical reduction of large symmetric games
AAAI'05 Proceedings of the 20th national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 2
Pure Nash equilibria: hard and easy games
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
A continuation method for Nash equilibria in structured games
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
IJCAI'07 Proceedings of the 20th international joint conference on Artifical intelligence
IJCAI'09 Proceedings of the 21st international jont conference on Artifical intelligence
Games with Congestion-Averse Utilities
SAGT '09 Proceedings of the 2nd International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory
On the Impact of Strategy and Utility Structures on Congestion-Averse Games
WINE '09 Proceedings of the 5th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics
Taxed congestion games with failures
Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence
Temporal action-graph games: a new representation for dynamic games
UAI '09 Proceedings of the Twenty-Fifth Conference on Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence
On the existence of pure strategy nash equilibria in integer-splittable weighted congestion games
SAGT'11 Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Algorithmic game theory
On the complexity of pure-strategy nash equilibria in congestion and local-effect games
WINE'06 Proceedings of the Second international conference on Internet and Network Economics
A general framework for computing optimal correlated equilibria in compact games
WINE'11 Proceedings of the 7th international conference on Internet and Network Economics
Computing nash equilibria of action-graph games via support enumeration
WINE'11 Proceedings of the 7th international conference on Internet and Network Economics
Scaling simulation-based game analysis through deviation-preserving reduction
Proceedings of the 11th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 2
Finding pure nash equilibrium of graphical game via constraints satisfaction approach
ESCAPE'07 Proceedings of the First international conference on Combinatorics, Algorithms, Probabilistic and Experimental Methodologies
| Hi-index | 0.00 |
We present a new class of games, local-effect games (LEGs), which exploit structure in a different way from other compact game representations studied in AI. We show both theoretically and empirically that these games often (but not always) have pure-strategy Nash equilibria. Finding a potential function is a good technique for finding such equilibria. We give a complete characterization of which LEGs have potential functions and provide the functions in each case; we also show a general case where pure-strategy equilibria exist in the absence of potential functions. In experiments, we show that myopic best-response dynamics converge quickly to pure strategy equilibria in games not covered by our positive theoretical results.