Journal of the ACM (JACM)
The complexity of pure Nash equilibria
STOC '04 Proceedings of the thirty-sixth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
The price of anarchy of finite congestion games
Proceedings of the thirty-seventh annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Congestion games with failures
Proceedings of the 6th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
IJCAI'07 Proceedings of the 20th international joint conference on Artifical intelligence
STACS'99 Proceedings of the 16th annual conference on Theoretical aspects of computer science
Pure nash equilibria in player-specific and weighted congestion games
WINE'06 Proceedings of the Second international conference on Internet and Network Economics
Proceedings of the 7th international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems - Volume 3
Graph Theory, Computational Intelligence and Thought
Taxed congestion games with failures
Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence
Stressed web environments as strategic games: risk profiles and weltanschauung
TGC'10 Proceedings of the 5th international conference on Trustworthly global computing
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We define a new class of games, congestion games with load-dependent failures (CGLFs), which generalizes the well-known class of congestion games, by incorporating the issue of resource failures into congestion games. In a CGLF, agents share a common set of resources, where each resource has a cost and a probability of failure. Each agent chooses a subset of the resources for the execution of his task, in order to maximize his own utility. The utility of an agent is the difference between his benefit from successful task completion and the sum of the costs over the resources he uses. CGLFs possess two novel features. It is the first model to incorporate failures into congestion settings, which results in a strict generalization of congestion games. In addition, it is the first model to consider load-dependent failures in such framework, where the failure probability of each resource depends on the number of agents selecting this resource. Although, as we show, CGLFs do not admit a potential function, and in general do not have a pure strategy Nash equilibrium, our main theorem proves the existence of a pure strategy Nash equilibrium in every CGLF with identical resources and nondecreasing cost functions.