Competitive routing in multiuser communication networks
IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking (TON)
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
STACS'99 Proceedings of the 16th annual conference on Theoretical aspects of computer science
Mechanism design with execution uncertainty
UAI'02 Proceedings of the Eighteenth conference on Uncertainty in artificial intelligence
Congestion games with load-dependent failures: identical resources
Proceedings of the 8th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
AAAI'06 Proceedings of the 21st national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
Mathematics of Operations Research
Games with Congestion-Averse Utilities
SAGT '09 Proceedings of the 2nd International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory
On the Impact of Strategy and Utility Structures on Congestion-Averse Games
WINE '09 Proceedings of the 5th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics
Taxed congestion games with failures
Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence
Stressed web environments as strategic games: risk profiles and weltanschauung
TGC'10 Proceedings of the 5th international conference on Trustworthly global computing
Congestion games with failures
Discrete Applied Mathematics
Proof systems and transformation games
Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence
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We introduce a new class of games, congestion games with failures (CGFs), which extends the class of congestion games to allow for facility failures. In a basic CGF (BCGF) agents share a common set of facilities (service providers), where each service provider (SP) may fail with some known probability. For reliability reasons, an agent may choose a subset of the SPs in order to try and perform his task. The cost of an agent for utilizing any SP is a function of the total number of agents using this SP. A main feature of this setting is that the cost for an agent for successful completion of his task is the minimum of the costs of his successful attempts. We show that although BCGFs do not admit a potential function, and thus are not isomorphic to classic congestion games, they always possess a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium. We also show that the SPs' congestion experienced in different Nash equilibria is (almost) unique. For the subclass of symmetric BCGFs we give a characterization of best and worst Nash equilibria. We extend the basic model by making task submission costly and define a model for taxed CGFs (TCGFs). We prove the existence of a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium for quasi-symmetric TCGFs, and present an efficient algorithm for constructing such Nash equilibrium in symmetric TCGFs.