Congestion games with failures
Proceedings of the 6th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Congestion games with malicious players
Proceedings of the 8th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Congestion games with load-dependent failures: identical resources
Proceedings of the 8th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Algorithmic Game Theory
On the Complexity of Equilibria Problems in Angel-Daemon Games
COCOON '08 Proceedings of the 14th annual international conference on Computing and Combinatorics
STACS'99 Proceedings of the 16th annual conference on Theoretical aspects of computer science
Web services and incerta spiriti: a game theoretic approach to uncertainty
ECSQARU'11 Proceedings of the 11th European conference on Symbolic and quantitative approaches to reasoning with uncertainty
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We consider the behaviour of a set of services in a stressed web environment where performance patterns may be difficult to predict. In stressed environments the performances of some providers may degrade while the performances of others, with elastic resources, may improve. The allocation of web-based providers to users (brokering) is modelled by a strategic non-cooperative angel-daemon game with risk profiles. A risk profile specifies a bound on the number of unreliable service providers within an environment without identifying the names of these providers. Risk profiles offer a means of analysing the behaviour of broker agents which allocate service providers to users. A Nash equilibrium is a fixed point of such a game in which no user can locally improve their choice of provider - thus, a Nash equilibrium is a viable solution to the provider/user allocation problem. Angel daemon games provide a means of reasoning about stressed environments and offer the possibility of designing brokers using risk profiles and Nash equilibria.