Structural complexity 1
Limits to parallel computation: P-completeness theory
Limits to parallel computation: P-completeness theory
A game-theoretic classification of interactive complexity classes
SCT '95 Proceedings of the 10th Annual Structure in Complexity Theory Conference (SCT'95)
The circuit value problem is log space complete for P
ACM SIGACT News
A Programming Model for the Orchestration of Web Services
SEFM '04 Proceedings of the Software Engineering and Formal Methods, Second International Conference
On the Complexity of Succinct Zero-Sum Games
CCC '05 Proceedings of the 20th Annual IEEE Conference on Computational Complexity
The computational complexity of nash equilibria in concisely represented games
EC '06 Proceedings of the 7th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
When selfish meets evil: byzantine players in a virus inoculation game
Proceedings of the twenty-fifth annual ACM symposium on Principles of distributed computing
Algorithmic Game Theory
Pure Nash equilibria: hard and easy games
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
ISAAC'05 Proceedings of the 16th international conference on Algorithms and Computation
Pure nash equilibria in games with a large number of actions
MFCS'05 Proceedings of the 30th international conference on Mathematical Foundations of Computer Science
Managing grid computations: an ORC-Based approach
ISPA'06 Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Parallel and Distributed Processing and Applications
Stressed web environments as strategic games: risk profiles and weltanschauung
TGC'10 Proceedings of the 5th international conference on Trustworthly global computing
Equilibria problems on games: Complexity versus succinctness
Journal of Computer and System Sciences
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We analyze the complexity of equilibria problems for a class of strategic zero-sum games, called Angel-Daemongames. Those games were introduced to asses the goodness of a web or grid orchestration on a faulty environment with bounded amount of failures [6]. It turns out that Angel-Daemongames are, at the best of our knowledge, the first natural example of zero-sum succinct games in the sense of [1],[9]. We show that deciding the existence of a pure Nash equilibrium or a dominant strategy for a given player is $\mathsf{\Sigma}^p_2$-complete. Furthermore, computing the value of an Angel-Daemon game is EXP-complete. Thus, matching the already known complexity results of the corresponding problems for the generic families of succinctly represented games with exponential number of actions.