On total functions, existence theorems and computational complexity
Theoretical Computer Science
Uniform constant-depth threshold circuits for division and iterated multiplication
Journal of Computer and System Sciences - Complexity 2001
Graphical Models for Game Theory
UAI '01 Proceedings of the 17th Conference in Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence
Playing large games using simple strategies
Proceedings of the 4th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
A game-theoretic classification of interactive complexity classes
SCT '95 Proceedings of the 10th Annual Structure in Complexity Theory Conference (SCT'95)
Pure Nash equilibria: hard and easy games
Proceedings of the 9th conference on Theoretical aspects of rationality and knowledge
On the Complexity of Succinct Zero-Sum Games
CCC '05 Proceedings of the 20th Annual IEEE Conference on Computational Complexity
Reducibility among equilibrium problems
Proceedings of the thirty-eighth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
The complexity of computing a Nash equilibrium
Proceedings of the thirty-eighth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Complexity results about Nash equilibria
IJCAI'03 Proceedings of the 18th international joint conference on Artificial intelligence
The complexity of games on highly regular graphs
ESA'05 Proceedings of the 13th annual European conference on Algorithms
The complexity of computing a Nash equilibrium
Proceedings of the thirty-eighth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Computing correlated equilibria in multi-player games
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
On the Complexity of Equilibria Problems in Angel-Daemon Games
COCOON '08 Proceedings of the 14th annual international conference on Computing and Combinatorics
Artificial Intelligence
Compact preference representation and Boolean games
Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems
On the complexity of Nash equilibria of action-graph games
SODA '09 Proceedings of the twentieth Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms
Symmetries and the complexity of pure Nash equilibrium
Journal of Computer and System Sciences
Equilibria of Graphical Games with Symmetries
WINE '08 Proceedings of the 4th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics
On the complexity of constrained Nash equilibria in graphical games
Theoretical Computer Science
On strictly competitive multi-player games
AAAI'06 Proceedings of the 21st national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
Symmetries and the complexity of pure Nash equilibrium
STACS'07 Proceedings of the 24th annual conference on Theoretical aspects of computer science
Weighted Boolean formula games
WINE'07 Proceedings of the 3rd international conference on Internet and network economics
Computing pure strategy nash equilibria in compact symmetric games
Proceedings of the 11th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Equilibria of graphical games with symmetries
Theoretical Computer Science
Economies with non-convex production and complexity equilibria
Proceedings of the 12th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Equilibria problems on games: Complexity versus succinctness
Journal of Computer and System Sciences
The complexity of game isomorphism
Theoretical Computer Science
On the complexity of pure-strategy nash equilibria in congestion and local-effect games
WINE'06 Proceedings of the Second international conference on Internet and Network Economics
Rational Generating Functions and Integer Programming Games
Operations Research
The Computational Complexity of Nash Equilibria in Concisely Represented Games
ACM Transactions on Computation Theory (TOCT)
Computational Aspects of Uncertainty Profiles and Angel-Daemon Games
Theory of Computing Systems
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Games may be represented in many different ways, and different representations of games affect the complexity of problems associated with games, such as finding a Nash equilibrium. The traditional method of representing a game is to explicitly list all the payoffs, but this incurs an exponential blowup as the number of agents grows. We study two models of concisely represented games: circuit games, where the payoffs are computed by a given boolean circuit, and graph games, where each agent's payoff is a function of only the strategies played by its neighbors in a given graph. For these two models, we study the complexity of four questions: determining if a given strategy is a Nash equilibrium, finding a Nash equilibrium, determining if there exists a pure Nash equilibrium, and determining if there exists a Nash equilibrium in which the payoffs to the players meet some given guarantees. In many cases, we obtain tight results, showing that the problems are complete for various complexity classes.