Algorithms, games, and the internet
STOC '01 Proceedings of the thirty-third annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Computers and Intractability: A Guide to the Theory of NP-Completeness
Computers and Intractability: A Guide to the Theory of NP-Completeness
The Structure and Complexity of Nash Equilibria for a Selfish Routing Game
ICALP '02 Proceedings of the 29th International Colloquium on Automata, Languages and Programming
Pure Nash equilibria: hard and easy games
Proceedings of the 9th conference on Theoretical aspects of rationality and knowledge
The complexity of pure Nash equilibria
STOC '04 Proceedings of the thirty-sixth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Complexity results about Nash equilibria
IJCAI'03 Proceedings of the 18th international joint conference on Artificial intelligence
The complexity of games on highly regular graphs
ESA'05 Proceedings of the 13th annual European conference on Algorithms
Pure nash equilibria in games with a large number of actions
MFCS'05 Proceedings of the 30th international conference on Mathematical Foundations of Computer Science
On the Complexity of Equilibria Problems in Angel-Daemon Games
COCOON '08 Proceedings of the 14th annual international conference on Computing and Combinatorics
Equilibria problems on games: Complexity versus succinctness
Journal of Computer and System Sciences
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We study the computational complexity of deciding the existence of a Pure Nash Equilibrium or a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium with a given payoff and other related problems in finite multi-player extensive games with perfect information. We propose three ways of representing a game with different degrees of succinctness for the components of the game. We show that when the number of moves of each player is large and the player function and the utilities are represented succinctly the considered problems are PSPACE-complete. In contraposition, when the game is described extensively by means of its associated tree all the problems are decidable in polynomial time.