The complexity of pure Nash equilibria
STOC '04 Proceedings of the thirty-sixth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
The price of anarchy of finite congestion games
Proceedings of the thirty-seventh annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Congestion games with failures
Proceedings of the 6th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
A Strategyproof Mechanism for Scheduling Divisible Loads in Distributed Systems
ISPDC '05 Proceedings of the The 4th International Symposium on Parallel and Distributed Computing
Selfish Multi-User Task Scheduling
ISPDC '06 Proceedings of the Proceedings of The Fifth International Symposium on Parallel and Distributed Computing
Proceedings of the 7th international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems - Volume 3
Truthful algorithms for scheduling selfish tasks on parallel machines
WINE'05 Proceedings of the First international conference on Internet and Network Economics
Games with Congestion-Averse Utilities
SAGT '09 Proceedings of the 2nd International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory
On the Impact of Strategy and Utility Structures on Congestion-Averse Games
WINE '09 Proceedings of the 5th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics
On the existence of pure strategy nash equilibria in integer-splittable weighted congestion games
SAGT'11 Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Algorithmic game theory
Join Me with the Weakest Partner, Please
WI-IAT '12 Proceedings of the The 2012 IEEE/WIC/ACM International Joint Conferences on Web Intelligence and Intelligent Agent Technology - Volume 02
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We introduce a new class of games called random order congestion games (ROCGs). In an ROCG, each player has a task that can be carried out by any element of a set of resources, and each resource executes its assigned tasks in a random order. The aim of each player is to minimize his expected cost, which is the sum of the fixed costs over the set of his utilized resources and the expected cost of his task execution. The cost of a player's task execution is determined by the earliest time his task is completed, and thus it might be beneficial for him to assign his task to several resources. We prove the existence of pure strategy Nash equilibria in ROCGs. Moreover, we present a polynomial time algorithm for finding such an equilibrium in a given ROCG.