Logical foundations of artificial intelligence
Logical foundations of artificial intelligence
Theoretical Computer Science
On the complexity of cooperative solution concepts
Mathematics of Operations Research
Fixed-Parameter Tractability and Completeness I: Basic Results
SIAM Journal on Computing
NP-completeness for calculating power indices of weighted majority games
Theoretical Computer Science
Introduction to algorithms
Computers and Intractability: A Guide to the Theory of NP-Completeness
Computers and Intractability: A Guide to the Theory of NP-Completeness
The Complexity of Counting in Sparse, Regular, and Planar Graphs
SIAM Journal on Computing
A heuristic technique for multi-agent planning
Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence
Distributed Problem-Solving as Concurrent Theorem Proving
Proceedings of the 8th European Workshop on Modelling Autonomous Agents in a Multi-Agent World: Multi-Agent Rationality
Planning for Distributed Theorem Proving: The Teamwork Approach
KI '96 Proceedings of the 20th Annual German Conference on Artificial Intelligence: Advances in Artificial Intelligence
Complexity of determining nonemptiness of the core
Proceedings of the 4th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Automated Planning: Theory & Practice
Automated Planning: Theory & Practice
TARK '01 Proceedings of the 8th conference on Theoretical aspects of rationality and knowledge
Congestion games with failures
Proceedings of the 6th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Efficient Auction Mechanisms for Supply Chain Procurement
Management Science
Winner determination for mixed multi-unit combinatorial auctions via petri nets
Proceedings of the 6th international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems
Mixed multi-unit combinatorial auctions for supply chain management
ACM SIGecom Exchanges
Divide and conquer: false-name manipulations in weighted voting games
Proceedings of the 7th international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems - Volume 2
Power and stability in connectivity games
Proceedings of the 7th international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems - Volume 2
Proceedings of the 7th international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems - Volume 2
Proceedings of the 7th international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems - Volume 2
Computationally-efficient winner determination for mixed multi-unit combinatorial auctions
Proceedings of the 7th international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems - Volume 2
The Complexity of Power-Index Comparison
AAIM '08 Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Algorithmic Aspects in Information and Management
Multiagent Systems: Algorithmic, Game-Theoretic, and Logical Foundations
Multiagent Systems: Algorithmic, Game-Theoretic, and Logical Foundations
Power in threshold network flow games
Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems
Confidentiality and Information Sharing in Supply Chain Coordination
Management Science
False name manipulations in weighted voting games: splitting, merging and annexation
Proceedings of The 8th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 1
The cost of stability in weighted voting games
Proceedings of The 8th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 2
Power Indices in Spanning Connectivity Games
AAIM '09 Proceedings of the 5th International Conference on Algorithmic Aspects in Information and Management
AAAI'04 Proceedings of the 19th national conference on Artifical intelligence
The Cost of Stability in Network Flow Games
MFCS '09 Proceedings of the 34th International Symposium on Mathematical Foundations of Computer Science 2009
Coalitional games in open anonymous environments
AAAI'05 Proceedings of the 20th national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 2
Computational complexity of weighted threshold games
AAAI'07 Proceedings of the 22nd national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
Optimal false-name-proof voting rules with costly voting
AAAI'08 Proceedings of the 23rd national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
Manipulating the quota in weighted voting games
AAAI'08 Proceedings of the 23rd national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
Beings: knowledge as interacting experts
IJCAI'75 Proceedings of the 4th international joint conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
On the computational complexity of coalitional resource games
Artificial Intelligence
IJCAI'09 Proceedings of the 21st international jont conference on Artifical intelligence
The Cost of Stability in Coalitional Games
SAGT '09 Proceedings of the 2nd International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory
Incentive-compatible, budget-balanced, yet highly efficient auctions for supply chain formation
Decision Support Systems - Special issue: The fourth ACM conference on electronic commerce
Approximating power indices: theoretical and empirical analysis
Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems
Honor among thieves: collusion in multi-unit auctions
Proceedings of the 9th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems: volume 1 - Volume 1
On agent types in coalition formation problems
Proceedings of the 9th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems: volume 1 - Volume 1
Proceedings of the 9th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems: volume 1 - Volume 1
Proof systems and transformation games
MFCS'10 Proceedings of the 35th international conference on Mathematical foundations of computer science
Minimal subsidies in expense sharing games
SAGT'10 Proceedings of the Third international conference on Algorithmic game theory
Collusion in VCG path procurement auctions
WINE'10 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Internet and network economics
False-name manipulations in weighted voting games
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
The least-core of threshold network flow games
MFCS'11 Proceedings of the 36th international conference on Mathematical foundations of computer science
Computational Aspects of Cooperative Game Theory (Synthesis Lectures on Artificial Inetlligence and Machine Learning)
An NTU cooperative game theoretic view of manipulating elections
WINE'11 Proceedings of the 7th international conference on Internet and Network Economics
Coalitional voting manipulation: a game-theoretic perspective
IJCAI'11 Proceedings of the Twenty-Second international joint conference on Artificial Intelligence - Volume Volume One
Subsidies, stability, and restricted cooperation in coalitional games
IJCAI'11 Proceedings of the Twenty-Second international joint conference on Artificial Intelligence - Volume Volume One
Agent failures in totally balanced games and convex games
WINE'12 Proceedings of the 8th international conference on Internet and Network Economics
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We introduce Transformation Games (TGs), a form of coalitional game in which players are endowed with sets of initial resources, and have capabilities allowing them to derive certain output resources, given certain input resources. The aim of a TG is to generate a particular target resource; players achieve this by forming a coalition capable of performing a sequence of transformations from a combined set of initial resources to the target resource. TGs can model a number of natural settings, such as cooperative proof systems, where a collection of agents having different expertise work together to derive a proof for a target theorem, or supply chains, where agents cooperate to create a target product from base resources. After presenting the TG model, and discussing its interpretation, we consider possible restrictions on the transformation chain, resulting in different coalitional games. Following the basic model, we consider the computational complexity of several problems in TGs, such as testing whether a coalition wins, checking if a player is a dummy or a veto player, computing the core of the game, computing power indices, and checking the effects of possible restrictions on the coalition. Finally, we consider extensions to the model in which transformations have associated costs.