On the complexity of cooperative solution concepts
Mathematics of Operations Research
NP-completeness for calculating power indices of weighted majority games
Theoretical Computer Science
Sharing the cost of multicast transmissions
Journal of Computer and System Sciences - Special issue on Internet algorithms
Computers and Intractability: A Guide to the Theory of NP-Completeness
Computers and Intractability: A Guide to the Theory of NP-Completeness
A linear approximation method for the Shapley value
Artificial Intelligence
Proceedings of the 7th international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems - Volume 2
Power and stability in connectivity games
Proceedings of the 7th international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems - Volume 2
A tractable and expressive class of marginal contribution nets and its applications
Proceedings of the 7th international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems - Volume 2
Proceedings of the 7th international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems - Volume 2
The impact of adversarial knowledge on adversarial planning in perimeter patrol
Proceedings of the 7th international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems - Volume 1
Proceedings of the 7th international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems: industrial track
Power in threshold network flow games
Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems
The Cost of Stability in Network Flow Games
MFCS '09 Proceedings of the 34th International Symposium on Mathematical Foundations of Computer Science 2009
ARMOR security for Los Angeles international airport
AAAI'08 Proceedings of the 23rd national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 3
On the complexity of core, kernel, and bargaining set
Artificial Intelligence
A double oracle algorithm for zero-sum security games on graphs
The 10th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 1
The least-core of threshold network flow games
MFCS'11 Proceedings of the 36th international conference on Mathematical foundations of computer science
Bribery in path-disruption games
ADT'11 Proceedings of the Second international conference on Algorithmic decision theory
Solving non-zero sum multiagent network flow security games with attack costs
Proceedings of the 11th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 2
Proof systems and transformation games
Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence
Sharing rewards in cooperative connectivity games
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
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We propose Path Disruption Games (PDGs), which consider collaboration between agents attempting stop an adversary from travelling from a source node to a target node in a graph. PDGs can model physical or network security domains. The coalition attempts to stop the adversary by placing checkpoints in intermediate nodes in the graph, to make sure the adversary cannot travel through them. Thus, the coalition wins if it controls a node subset whose removal from the graph disconnects the source and target. We analyze this domain from a cooperative game theoretic perspective, and consider how the gains can be distributed between the agents controlling the vertices. We also consider power indices, which express the influence of each checkpoint location on the outcome of the game, and can be used to identify the most critical locations where checkpoints should be placed. We consider both general graphs and the restricted case of trees, and consider both a model with no cost for placing a checkpoint and a model with where each vertex has its own cost for placing a checkpoint.