On the complexity of cooperative solution concepts
Mathematics of Operations Research
NP-completeness for calculating power indices of weighted majority games
Theoretical Computer Science
Sharing the cost of multicast transmissions
Journal of Computer and System Sciences - Special issue on Internet algorithms
Computers and Intractability: A Guide to the Theory of NP-Completeness
Computers and Intractability: A Guide to the Theory of NP-Completeness
The Complexity of Counting in Sparse, Regular, and Planar Graphs
SIAM Journal on Computing
Computing the Banzhaf power index in network flow games
Proceedings of the 6th international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems
Coalitional games in open anonymous environments
AAAI'05 Proceedings of the 20th national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 2
Computational complexity of weighted threshold games
AAAI'07 Proceedings of the 22nd national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
False name manipulations in weighted voting games: splitting, merging and annexation
Proceedings of The 8th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 1
Power Indices in Spanning Connectivity Games
AAIM '09 Proceedings of the 5th International Conference on Algorithmic Aspects in Information and Management
Honor among thieves: collusion in multi-unit auctions
Proceedings of the 9th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems: volume 1 - Volume 1
Proceedings of the 9th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems: volume 1 - Volume 1
Proof systems and transformation games
MFCS'10 Proceedings of the 35th international conference on Mathematical foundations of computer science
Minimal subsidies in expense sharing games
SAGT'10 Proceedings of the Third international conference on Algorithmic game theory
On the complexity of core, kernel, and bargaining set
Artificial Intelligence
The least-core of threshold network flow games
MFCS'11 Proceedings of the 36th international conference on Mathematical foundations of computer science
Graph-based coalitional games: an analysis via characteristics
Proceedings of the 5th International ICST Conference on Performance Evaluation Methodologies and Tools
Concise characteristic function representations in coalitional games based on agent types
IJCAI'11 Proceedings of the Twenty-Second international joint conference on Artificial Intelligence - Volume Volume One
Crowd IQ: aggregating opinions to boost performance
Proceedings of the 11th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 1
Proof systems and transformation games
Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence
Efficient computation of the shapley value for game-theoretic network centrality
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
Computing cooperative solution concepts in coalitional skill games
Artificial Intelligence
IJCAI'13 Proceedings of the Twenty-Third international joint conference on Artificial Intelligence
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We consider computational aspects of a game theoretic approach to network reliability. Consider a network where failure of one node may disrupt communication between two other nodes. We model this network as a simple coalitional game, called the vertex Connectivity Game (CG). In this game, each agent owns a vertex, and controls all the edges going to and from that vertex. A coalition of agents wins if it fully connects a certain subset of vertices in the graph, called the primary vertices. We show that power indices, which express an agent's ability to affect the outcome of the vertex connectivity game, can be used to identify significant possible points of failure in the communication network, and can thus be used to increase network reliability. We show that in general graphs, calculating the Banzhaf power index is #P-complete, but suggest a polynomial algorithm for calculating this index in trees. We also show a polynomial algorithm for computing the core of a CG, which allows a stable division of payments to coalition agents.