Logical foundations of artificial intelligence
Logical foundations of artificial intelligence
On the complexity of cooperative solution concepts
Mathematics of Operations Research
Distributed Problem-Solving as Concurrent Theorem Proving
Proceedings of the 8th European Workshop on Modelling Autonomous Agents in a Multi-Agent World: Multi-Agent Rationality
Planning for Distributed Theorem Proving: The Teamwork Approach
KI '96 Proceedings of the 20th Annual German Conference on Artificial Intelligence: Advances in Artificial Intelligence
Efficient Auction Mechanisms for Supply Chain Procurement
Management Science
Power and stability in connectivity games
Proceedings of the 7th international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems - Volume 2
Proceedings of the 7th international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems - Volume 2
Power in threshold network flow games
Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems
Computational complexity of weighted threshold games
AAAI'07 Proceedings of the 22nd national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
Beings: knowledge as interacting experts
IJCAI'75 Proceedings of the 4th international joint conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
On the computational complexity of coalitional resource games
Artificial Intelligence
Incentive-compatible, budget-balanced, yet highly efficient auctions for supply chain formation
Decision Support Systems - Special issue: The fourth ACM conference on electronic commerce
Approximating power indices: theoretical and empirical analysis
Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems
Proof systems and transformation games
Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence
Sharing rewards in cooperative connectivity games
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
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We introduce TransformationGames (TGs), a formof coalitional game in which players are endowed with sets of initial resources, and have capabilities allowing them to derive certain output resources, given certain input resources. The aim of a TG is to generate a particular target resource; players achieve this by forming a coalition capable of performing a sequence of transformations from its combined set of initial resources to the target resource. After presenting the TG model, and discussing its interpretation, we consider possible restrictions on the transformation chain, resulting in different coalitional games. After presenting the basic model, we consider the computational complexity of several problems in TGs, such as testing whether a coalition wins, checking if a player is a dummy or a veto player, computing the core of the game, computing power indices, and checking the effects of possible restrictions on the coalition. Finally, we consider extensions to the model in which transformations have associated costs.