On the complexity of cooperative solution concepts
Mathematics of Operations Research
Methods for task allocation via agent coalition formation
Artificial Intelligence
NP-completeness for calculating power indices of weighted majority games
Theoretical Computer Science
Computers and Intractability: A Guide to the Theory of NP-Completeness
Computers and Intractability: A Guide to the Theory of NP-Completeness
Complexity of manipulating elections with few candidates
Eighteenth national conference on Artificial intelligence
Complexity of determining nonemptiness of the core
Proceedings of the 4th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
On the computational complexity of qualitative coalitional games
Artificial Intelligence
Multi-attribute coalitional games
EC '06 Proceedings of the 7th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
On the computational complexity of coalitional resource games
Artificial Intelligence
AAAI'04 Proceedings of the 19th national conference on Artifical intelligence
Coalitional games in open anonymous environments
AAAI'05 Proceedings of the 20th national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 2
Infeasibility certificates and the complexity of the core in coalitional games
IJCAI'07 Proceedings of the 20th international joint conference on Artifical intelligence
Solving coalitional resource games
Artificial Intelligence
Coalitional affinity games and the stability gap
IJCAI'09 Proceedings of the 21st international jont conference on Artifical intelligence
Coalition structure generation utilizing compact characteristic function representations
CP'09 Proceedings of the 15th international conference on Principles and practice of constraint programming
Monotone cooperative games and their threshold versions
Proceedings of the 9th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems: volume 1 - Volume 1
Proceedings of the 9th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems: volume 1 - Volume 1
Proof systems and transformation games
MFCS'10 Proceedings of the 35th international conference on Mathematical foundations of computer science
Non-transferable utility coalitional games via mixed-integer linear constraints
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
Minimal subsidies in expense sharing games
SAGT'10 Proceedings of the Third international conference on Algorithmic game theory
Cooperative games with overlapping coalitions
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
On the complexity of core, kernel, and bargaining set
Artificial Intelligence
Deploying power grid-integrated electric vehicles as a multi-agent system
The 10th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 1
Complexity of coalition structure generation
The 10th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 1
The 10th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 3
Concise characteristic function representations in coalitional games based on agent types
IJCAI'11 Proceedings of the Twenty-Second international joint conference on Artificial Intelligence - Volume Volume One
Proof systems and transformation games
Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence
Computing cooperative solution concepts in coalitional skill games
Artificial Intelligence
Coalitional games via network flows
IJCAI'13 Proceedings of the Twenty-Third international joint conference on Artificial Intelligence
An efficient vector-based representation for coalitional games
IJCAI'13 Proceedings of the Twenty-Third international joint conference on Artificial Intelligence
Sharing rewards in cooperative connectivity games
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
Fostering Cooperation through Dynamic Coalition Formation and Partner Switching
ACM Transactions on Autonomous and Adaptive Systems (TAAS)
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We consider Coalitional Skill Games (CSGs), a simple model of cooperation among agents. This is a restricted form of coalitional games, where each agent has a set of skills that are required to complete various tasks. Each task requires a set of skills in order to be completed, and a coalition can accomplish the task only if the coalition's agents cover the set of required skills for the task. The gain for a coalition depends only on the subset of tasks it can complete. We consider the computational complexity of several problems in CSGs, for example, testing if an agent is a dummy or veto agent, computing the core of the game or testing whether the core is empty, and finding the Shapley value or Banzhaf power index of agents.