On the complexity of cooperative solution concepts
Mathematics of Operations Research
Computers and Intractability: A Guide to the Theory of NP-Completeness
Computers and Intractability: A Guide to the Theory of NP-Completeness
Matching games: the least core and the nucleolus
Mathematics of Operations Research
Proceedings of the 7th international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems - Volume 2
Proceedings of the 7th international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems - Volume 2
Power in threshold network flow games
Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems
Computing the nucleolus of weighted voting games
SODA '09 Proceedings of the twentieth Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms
The cost of stability in weighted voting games
Proceedings of The 8th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 2
The Cost of Stability in Network Flow Games
MFCS '09 Proceedings of the 34th International Symposium on Mathematical Foundations of Computer Science 2009
Computational complexity of weighted threshold games
AAAI'07 Proceedings of the 22nd national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
The Cost of Stability in Coalitional Games
SAGT '09 Proceedings of the 2nd International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory
WINE '09 Proceedings of the 5th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics
Minimal subsidies in expense sharing games
SAGT'10 Proceedings of the Third international conference on Algorithmic game theory
On the complexity of core, kernel, and bargaining set
Artificial Intelligence
Complexity of coalition structure generation
The 10th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 1
Subsidies, stability, and restricted cooperation in coalitional games
IJCAI'11 Proceedings of the Twenty-Second international joint conference on Artificial Intelligence - Volume Volume One
Computing cooperative solution concepts in coalitional skill games
Artificial Intelligence
Hi-index | 0.00 |
Cooperative games provide an appropriate framework for fair and stable resource allocation in multiagent systems. This paper focusses on monotone cooperative games, a class which comprises a variety of games that have enjoyed special attention within AI, in particular, skill games, connectivity games, flow games, voting games, and matching games. Given a threshold, each monotone cooperative game naturally corresponds to a simple game. The core of a threshold version may be empty, even if that is not the case in the monotonic game itself. For each of the subclasses of monotonic games mentioned above, we conduct a computational analysis of problems concerning some relaxations of the core such as the least-core and the cost of stability. It is shown that threshold versions of monotonic games are generally at least as hard to handle computationally. We also introduce the length of a simple game as the size of the smallest winning coalition and study its computational complexity in various classes of simple games and its relationship with computing core-based solutions. A number of computational hardness results are contrasted with polynomial time algorithms to compute the length of threshold matching games and the cost of stability of matching games, spanning connectivity games, and simple coalitional skill games with a constant number of skills.