The economic approach to artificial intelligence
ACM Computing Surveys (CSUR)
Computers and Intractability: A Guide to the Theory of NP-Completeness
Computers and Intractability: A Guide to the Theory of NP-Completeness
Marginal contribution nets: a compact representation scheme for coalitional games
Proceedings of the 6th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
The cost of stability in weighted voting games
Proceedings of The 8th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 2
Coalition Structures in Weighted Voting Games
Proceedings of the 2008 conference on ECAI 2008: 18th European Conference on Artificial Intelligence
AAAI'04 Proceedings of the 19th national conference on Artifical intelligence
The complexity of bribery in elections
AAAI'06 Proceedings of the 21st national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
The Cost of Stability in Network Flow Games
MFCS '09 Proceedings of the 34th International Symposium on Mathematical Foundations of Computer Science 2009
Coalitional games in open anonymous environments
AAAI'05 Proceedings of the 20th national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 2
Computational complexity of weighted threshold games
AAAI'07 Proceedings of the 22nd national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
IJCAI'85 Proceedings of the 9th international joint conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
Infeasibility certificates and the complexity of the core in coalitional games
IJCAI'07 Proceedings of the 20th international joint conference on Artifical intelligence
Complexity of constructing solutions in the core based on synergies among coalitions
Artificial Intelligence
Monotone cooperative games and their threshold versions
Proceedings of the 9th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems: volume 1 - Volume 1
Minimal subsidies in expense sharing games
SAGT'10 Proceedings of the Third international conference on Algorithmic game theory
Collusion in VCG path procurement auctions
WINE'10 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Internet and network economics
The good, the bad and the cautious: safety level cooperative games
WINE'10 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Internet and network economics
On the complexity of core, kernel, and bargaining set
Artificial Intelligence
Designing incentives for Boolean games
The 10th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 1
The least-core of threshold network flow games
MFCS'11 Proceedings of the 36th international conference on Mathematical foundations of computer science
Representation of coalitional games with algebraic decision diagrams
The 10th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 3
Bribery in path-disruption games
ADT'11 Proceedings of the Second international conference on Algorithmic decision theory
PRIMA'11 Proceedings of the 14th international conference on Agents in Principle, Agents in Practice
Manipulating boolean games through communication
IJCAI'11 Proceedings of the Twenty-Second international joint conference on Artificial Intelligence - Volume Volume One
On the complexity of the core over coalition structures
IJCAI'11 Proceedings of the Twenty-Second international joint conference on Artificial Intelligence - Volume Volume One
Subsidies, stability, and restricted cooperation in coalitional games
IJCAI'11 Proceedings of the Twenty-Second international joint conference on Artificial Intelligence - Volume Volume One
Enforcing efficient equilibria in network design games via subsidies
Proceedings of the twenty-fourth annual ACM symposium on Parallelism in algorithms and architectures
Incentive engineering for Boolean games
Artificial Intelligence
Proof systems and transformation games
Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence
Multiagent systems, and the search for appropriate foundations
Proceedings of the 2013 international conference on Autonomous agents and multi-agent systems
Proceedings of the 2013 international conference on Autonomous agents and multi-agent systems
Taxation and stability in cooperative games
Proceedings of the 2013 international conference on Autonomous agents and multi-agent systems
Computing cooperative solution concepts in coalitional skill games
Artificial Intelligence
Sharing rewards in cooperative connectivity games
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
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A key question in cooperative game theory is that of coalitional stability, usually captured by the notion of the core --the set of outcomes such that no subgroup of players has an incentive to deviate. However, some coalitional games have empty cores, and any outcome in such a game is unstable. In this paper, we investigate the possibility of stabilizing a coalitional game by using external payments. We consider a scenario where an external party, which is interested in having the players work together, offers a supplemental payment to the grand coalition (or, more generally, a particular coalition structure). This payment is conditional on players not deviating from their coalition(s). The sum of this payment plus the actual gains of the coalition(s) may then be divided among the agents so as to promote stability. We define the cost of stability (CoS) as the minimal external payment that stabilizes the game. We provide general bounds on the cost of stability in several classes of games, and explore its algorithmic properties. To develop a better intuition for the concepts we introduce, we provide a detailed algorithmic study of the cost of stability in weighted voting games, a simple but expressive class of games which can model decision-making in political bodies, and cooperation in multiagent settings. Finally, we extend our model and results to games with coalition structures.