Rational interaction: cooperation among intelligent agents
Rational interaction: cooperation among intelligent agents
Synchronization of multi-agent plans
Distributed Artificial Intelligence
Cooperation without communication
Distributed Artificial Intelligence
Emergent coordination through the use of cooperative state-changing rules
AAAI '94 Proceedings of the twelfth national conference on Artificial intelligence (vol. 1)
Rules of encounter: designing conventions for automated negotiation among computers
Rules of encounter: designing conventions for automated negotiation among computers
Coalition, cryptography, and stability: mechanisms for coalition formation in task oriented domains
AAAI '94 Proceedings of the twelfth national conference on Artificial intelligence (vol. 1)
A broader picture of the complexity of strategic behavior in multi-winner elections
Proceedings of the 7th international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems - Volume 2
Algorithms for the coalitional manipulation problem
Artificial Intelligence
The learnability of voting rules
Artificial Intelligence
Junta distributions and the average-case complexity of manipulating elections
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
Negotiation and task sharing among autonomous agents in cooperative domains
IJCAI'89 Proceedings of the 11th international joint conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 2
Multi-agent planning as a dynamic search for social consensus
IJCAI'93 Proceedings of the 13th international joint conference on Artifical intelligence - Volume 1
IJCAI'85 Proceedings of the 9th international joint conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
The Cost of Stability in Coalitional Games
SAGT '09 Proceedings of the 2nd International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory
The Clarke tax as a consensus mechanism among automated agents
AAAI'91 Proceedings of the ninth National conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
Algorithms for strategyproof classification
Artificial Intelligence
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Over 25 years ago, faced with a request to provide a short description of my research, I ventured that my work focused on the use of economic theory, voting theory, and game theory to establish appropriate foundations for Multiagent Systems (though the original wording was slightly different). That has remained an accurate description of my research, and it is a description that I still use. In this talk, I will discuss how this meta-description found instantiation in a wide range of my research group's work, the ways in which my perspective has changed over the years, and my understanding of our short-term and long-term challenges in Multiagent Systems. Along the way, I'll elaborate on some specific observations, about research in the field and the field itself, including: - Some of the disruptions that have occurred in MAS, including the move to include self-motivated agents as an important subject for research, and the acceptance of mechanism design as a legitimate topic to be included in artificial intelligence; - Some of the wider trends in AI that have had a more minor impact on MAS; - Ways in which intuitions about interaction have driven my formal research; - The heterogeneous origins of the field, and the lasting impact that has had on its development.