Algorithms for the coalitional manipulation problem

Authors:
Michael Zuckerman;Ariel D. Procaccia;Jeffrey S. Rosenschein
Affiliations:
School of Engineering and Computer Science, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Jerusalem 91904, Israel;Microsoft Israel R&D Center, 13 Shenkar Street, Herzeliya 46725, Israel;School of Engineering and Computer Science, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Jerusalem 91904, Israel
Venue:
Artificial Intelligence
Year:
2009

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Abstract

We investigate the problem of coalitional manipulation in elections, which is known to be hard in a variety of voting rules. We put forward efficient algorithms for the problem in Borda, Maximin and Plurality with Runoff, and analyze their windows of error. Specifically, given an instance on which an algorithm fails, we bound the additional power the manipulators need in order to succeed. We finally discuss the implications of our results with respect to the popular approach of employing computational hardness to preclude manipulation.