Complexity of manipulating elections with few candidates
Eighteenth national conference on Artificial intelligence
When are elections with few candidates hard to manipulate?
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
Algorithms for the coalitional manipulation problem
Artificial Intelligence
The complexity of bribery in elections
AAAI'06 Proceedings of the 21st national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
How hard is bribery in elections?
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
Complexity of unweighted coalitional manipulation under some common voting rules
IJCAI'09 Proceedings of the 21st international jont conference on Artifical intelligence
Complexity of safe strategic voting
SAGT'10 Proceedings of the Third international conference on Algorithmic game theory
Computing the margin of victory for various voting rules
Proceedings of the 13th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce
Unweighted coalitional manipulation under the Borda rule Is NP-hard
IJCAI'11 Proceedings of the Twenty-Second international joint conference on Artificial Intelligence - Volume Volume One
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Persuasion is a common social and economic activity. It usually arises when conflicting interests among agents exist, and one of the agents wishes to sway the opinions of others. This paper considers the problem of an automated agent that needs to influence the decision of a group of self-interested agents that must reach an agreement on a joint action. For example, consider an automated agent that aims to reduce the energy consumption of a nonresidential building, by convincing a group of people who share an office to agree on an economy mode of the air-conditioning and low light intensity. In this paper we present four problems that address issues of minimality and safety of the persuasion process. We discuss the relationships to similar problems from social choice, and show that if the agents are using Plurality or Veto as their voting rule all of our problems are in P. We also show that with K-Approval, Bucklin and Borda voting rules some problems become intractable. We thus present heuristics for efficient persuasion with Borda, and evaluate them through simulations.