Introduction to algorithms
Journal of Computer and System Sciences
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
Rank aggregation methods for the Web
Proceedings of the 10th international conference on World Wide Web
Proceedings of the Seventeenth National Conference on Artificial Intelligence and Twelfth Conference on Innovative Applications of Artificial Intelligence
Vote elicitation: complexity and strategy-proofness
Eighteenth national conference on Artificial intelligence
Junta distributions and the average-case complexity of manipulating elections
AAMAS '06 Proceedings of the fifth international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems
A computational study of the Kemeny rule for preference aggregation
AAAI'04 Proceedings of the 19th national conference on Artifical intelligence
Computing slater rankings using similarities among candidates
AAAI'06 Proceedings of the 21st national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
Improved bounds for computing Kemeny rankings
AAAI'06 Proceedings of the 21st national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
Nonexistence of voting rules that are usually hard to manipulate
AAAI'06 Proceedings of the 21st national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
The complexity of bribery in elections
AAAI'06 Proceedings of the 21st national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
Anyone but him: the complexity of precluding an alternative
AAAI'05 Proceedings of the 20th national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
Universal voting protocol tweaks to make manipulation hard
IJCAI'03 Proceedings of the 18th international joint conference on Artificial intelligence
Hybrid voting protocols and hardness of manipulation
ISAAC'05 Proceedings of the 16th international conference on Algorithms and Computation
Algorithms for the coalitional manipulation problem
Proceedings of the nineteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
A sufficient condition for voting rules to be frequently manipulable
Proceedings of the 9th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Generalized scoring rules and the frequency of coalitional manipulability
Proceedings of the 9th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Automated design of scoring rules by learning from examples
Proceedings of the 7th international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems - Volume 2
Evaluation of election outcomes under uncertainty
Proceedings of the 7th international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems - Volume 2
Complexity of terminating preference elicitation
Proceedings of the 7th international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems - Volume 2
Proceedings of the 7th international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems - Volume 2
A broader picture of the complexity of strategic behavior in multi-winner elections
Proceedings of the 7th international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems - Volume 2
Proceedings of the 7th international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems - Volume 3
Copeland Voting Fully Resists Constructive Control
AAIM '08 Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Algorithmic Aspects in Information and Management
Parameterized Computational Complexity of Dodgson and Young Elections
SWAT '08 Proceedings of the 11th Scandinavian workshop on Algorithm Theory
Parameterized Complexity of Candidate Control in Elections and Related Digraph Problems
COCOA 2008 Proceedings of the 2nd international conference on Combinatorial Optimization and Applications
Algorithms for the coalitional manipulation problem
Artificial Intelligence
Frequent Manipulability of Elections: The Case of Two Voters
WINE '08 Proceedings of the 4th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics
Parameterized computational complexity of control problems in voting systems
Theoretical Computer Science
Boolean combinations of weighted voting games
Proceedings of The 8th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 1
The learnability of voting rules
Artificial Intelligence
Proceedings of the 12th Conference on Theoretical Aspects of Rationality and Knowledge
A new perspective on implementation by voting trees
Proceedings of the 10th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Adaptation of Voting Rules in Agent Societies
Organized Adaption in Multi-Agent Systems
Approximability of manipulating elections
AAAI'08 Proceedings of the 23rd national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
Determining possible and necessary winners under common voting rules given partial orders
AAAI'08 Proceedings of the 23rd national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
Complexity of strategic behavior in multi-winner elections
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
Parameterized complexity of candidate control in elections and related digraph problems
Theoretical Computer Science
Eliciting single-peaked preferences using comparison queries
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
Llull and Copeland voting computationally resist bribery and constructive control
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
How hard is bribery in elections?
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
Nonmanipulable selections from a tournament
IJCAI'09 Proceedings of the 21st international jont conference on Artifical intelligence
A multivariate complexity analysis of determining possible winners given incomplete votes
IJCAI'09 Proceedings of the 21st international jont conference on Artifical intelligence
Where are the really hard manipulation problems? the phase transition in manipulating the veto rule
IJCAI'09 Proceedings of the 21st international jont conference on Artifical intelligence
Finite local consistency characterizes generalized scoring rules
IJCAI'09 Proceedings of the 21st international jont conference on Artifical intelligence
Complexity of unweighted coalitional manipulation under some common voting rules
IJCAI'09 Proceedings of the 21st international jont conference on Artifical intelligence
Making decisions based on the preferences of multiple agents
Communications of the ACM
Manipulating Tournaments in Cup and Round Robin Competitions
ADT '09 Proceedings of the 1st International Conference on Algorithmic Decision Theory
The Effects of Noise and Manipulation on the Accuracy of Collective Decision Rules
ADT '09 Proceedings of the 1st International Conference on Algorithmic Decision Theory
SAGT '09 Proceedings of the 2nd International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory
Parameterized complexity of control problems in Maximin election
Information Processing Letters
A scheduling approach to coalitional manipulation
Proceedings of the 11th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Manipulation of copeland elections
Proceedings of the 9th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems: volume 1 - Volume 1
On the role of distances in defining voting rules
Proceedings of the 9th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems: volume 1 - Volume 1
Using complexity to protect elections
Communications of the ACM
Towards a dichotomy for the Possible Winner problem in elections based on scoring rules
Journal of Computer and System Sciences
An Empirical Study of the Manipulability of Single Transferable Voting
Proceedings of the 2010 conference on ECAI 2010: 19th European Conference on Artificial Intelligence
Control complexity in fallback voting
CATS '10 Proceedings of the Sixteenth Symposium on Computing: the Australasian Theory - Volume 109
Comparing multiagent systems research in combinatorial auctions and voting
Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence
Is computational complexity a barrier to manipulation?
CLIMA'10 Proceedings of the 11th international conference on Computational logic in multi-agent systems
Information and Computation
Complexity of safe strategic voting
SAGT'10 Proceedings of the Third international conference on Algorithmic game theory
Strategy-proof voting rules over multi-issue domains with restricted preferences
WINE'10 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Internet and network economics
Preferences in AI: An overview
Artificial Intelligence
Review: logical mechanism design
The Knowledge Engineering Review
The complexity of manipulative attacks in nearly single-peaked electorates
Proceedings of the 13th Conference on Theoretical Aspects of Rationality and Knowledge
Multimode control attacks on elections
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
Ties matter: complexity of voting manipulation revisited
The 10th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 1
Possible and necessary winners in voting trees: majority graphs vs. profiles
The 10th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 1
Solving election manipulation using integer partitioning problems
The 10th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 2
The complexity of voter partition in Bucklin and fallback voting: solving three open problems
The 10th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 2
An algorithm for the coalitional manipulation problem under Maximin
The 10th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 2
Computational complexity of two variants of the possible winner problem
The 10th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 2
Computational social choice: the first four centuries
XRDS: Crossroads, The ACM Magazine for Students - Computer Science in Service of Democracy
Empirical evaluation of voting rules with strictly ordered preference data
ADT'11 Proceedings of the Second international conference on Algorithmic decision theory
Determining possible and necessary winners under common voting rules given partial orders
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
A Quantitative Version of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem for Three Alternatives
SIAM Journal on Computing
Interleaving multi-agent systems and social networks for organized adaptation
Computational & Mathematical Organization Theory
Is computational complexity a barrier to manipulation?
Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence
Taking the final step to a full dichotomy of the possible winner problem in pure scoring rules
Information Processing Letters
Winner determination in voting trees with incomplete preferences and weighted votes
Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems
An NTU cooperative game theoretic view of manipulating elections
WINE'11 Proceedings of the 7th international conference on Internet and Network Economics
Where are the hard manipulation problems?
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
Computing the margin of victory for various voting rules
Proceedings of the 13th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce
Coalitional voting manipulation: a game-theoretic perspective
IJCAI'11 Proceedings of the Twenty-Second international joint conference on Artificial Intelligence - Volume Volume One
Unweighted coalitional manipulation under the Borda rule Is NP-hard
IJCAI'11 Proceedings of the Twenty-Second international joint conference on Artificial Intelligence - Volume Volume One
Multi-agent soft constraint aggregation via sequential voting
IJCAI'11 Proceedings of the Twenty-Second international joint conference on Artificial Intelligence - Volume Volume One
Ties matter: complexity of voting manipulation revisited
IJCAI'11 Proceedings of the Twenty-Second international joint conference on Artificial Intelligence - Volume Volume Three
Cecision making under uncertainty: social choice and manipulation
IJCAI'11 Proceedings of the Twenty-Second international joint conference on Artificial Intelligence - Volume Volume Three
On the evaluation of election outcomes under uncertainty
Artificial Intelligence
Campaigns for lazy voters: truncated ballots
Proceedings of the 11th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 2
Proceedings of the 11th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 2
Studies in computational aspects of voting: open problems of downey and fellows
The Multivariate Algorithmic Revolution and Beyond
Control complexity in bucklin, fallback, and plurality voting: an experimental approach
SEA'12 Proceedings of the 11th international conference on Experimental Algorithms
On swap-distance geometry of voting rules
Proceedings of the 2013 international conference on Autonomous agents and multi-agent systems
Manipulating two stage voting rules
Proceedings of the 2013 international conference on Autonomous agents and multi-agent systems
Coalitional manipulation for Schulze's rule
Proceedings of the 2013 international conference on Autonomous agents and multi-agent systems
Maximal recursive rule: a new social decision scheme
IJCAI'13 Proceedings of the Twenty-Third international joint conference on Artificial Intelligence
Control in the presence of manipulators: cooperative and competitive cases
IJCAI'13 Proceedings of the Twenty-Third international joint conference on Artificial Intelligence
How to change a group's collective decision?
IJCAI'13 Proceedings of the Twenty-Third international joint conference on Artificial Intelligence
Control complexity of schulze voting
IJCAI'13 Proceedings of the Twenty-Third international joint conference on Artificial Intelligence
Discrete Applied Mathematics
The complexity of manipulative attacks in nearly single-peaked electorates
Artificial Intelligence
The complexity of online manipulation of sequential elections
Journal of Computer and System Sciences
Bribery in voting with CP-nets
Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence
Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence
A smooth transition from powerlessness to absolute power
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
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In multiagent settings where the agents have different preferences, preference aggregation is a central issue. Voting is a general method for preference aggregation, but seminal results have shown that all general voting protocols are manipulable. One could try to avoid manipulation by using protocols where determining a beneficial manipulation is hard. Especially among computational agents, it is reasonable to measure this hardness by computational complexity. Some earlier work has been done in this area, but it was assumed that the number of voters and candidates is unbounded. Such hardness results lose relevance when the number of candidates is small, because manipulation algorithms that are exponential only in the number of candidates (and only slightly so) might be available. We give such an algorithm for an individual agent to manipulate the Single Transferable Vote (STV) protocol, which has been shown hard to manipulate in the above sense. This motivates the core of this article, which derives hardness results for realistic elections where the number of candidates is a small constant (but the number of voters can be large). The main manipulation question we study is that of coalitional manipulation by weighted voters. (We show that for simpler manipulation problems, manipulation cannot be hard with few candidates.) We study both constructive manipulation (making a given candidate win) and destructive manipulation (making a given candidate not win). We characterize the exact number of candidates for which manipulation becomes hard for the plurality, Borda, STV, Copeland, maximin, veto, plurality with runoff, regular cup, and randomized cup protocols. We also show that hardness of manipulation in this setting implies hardness of manipulation by an individual in unweighted settings when there is uncertainty about the others' votes (but not vice-versa). To our knowledge, these are the first results on the hardness of manipulation when there is uncertainty about the others' votes.