Preemptive Scheduling of Uniform Processor Systems
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
Journal of Computer and System Sciences
When are elections with few candidates hard to manipulate?
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
A sufficient condition for voting rules to be frequently manipulable
Proceedings of the 9th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Generalized scoring rules and the frequency of coalitional manipulability
Proceedings of the 9th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Proceedings of the 7th international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems - Volume 2
Elections Can be Manipulated Often
FOCS '08 Proceedings of the 2008 49th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Scheduling: Theory, Algorithms, and Systems
Scheduling: Theory, Algorithms, and Systems
Algorithms for the coalitional manipulation problem
Artificial Intelligence
Scheduling Algorithms
Nonexistence of voting rules that are usually hard to manipulate
AAAI'06 Proceedings of the 21st national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
Junta distributions and the average-case complexity of manipulating elections
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
Universal voting protocol tweaks to make manipulation hard
IJCAI'03 Proceedings of the 18th international joint conference on Artificial intelligence
Finite local consistency characterizes generalized scoring rules
IJCAI'09 Proceedings of the 21st international jont conference on Artifical intelligence
Complexity of unweighted coalitional manipulation under some common voting rules
IJCAI'09 Proceedings of the 21st international jont conference on Artifical intelligence
Hybrid voting protocols and hardness of manipulation
ISAAC'05 Proceedings of the 16th international conference on Algorithms and Computation
Towards a dichotomy for the Possible Winner problem in elections based on scoring rules
Journal of Computer and System Sciences
Comparing multiagent systems research in combinatorial auctions and voting
Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence
Strategy-proof voting rules over multi-issue domains with restricted preferences
WINE'10 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Internet and network economics
Approximation algorithms for campaign management
WINE'10 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Internet and network economics
Ties matter: complexity of voting manipulation revisited
The 10th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 1
Determining possible and necessary winners under common voting rules given partial orders
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
Taking the final step to a full dichotomy of the possible winner problem in pure scoring rules
Information Processing Letters
An NTU cooperative game theoretic view of manipulating elections
WINE'11 Proceedings of the 7th international conference on Internet and Network Economics
Coalitional voting manipulation: a game-theoretic perspective
IJCAI'11 Proceedings of the Twenty-Second international joint conference on Artificial Intelligence - Volume Volume One
Unweighted coalitional manipulation under the Borda rule Is NP-hard
IJCAI'11 Proceedings of the Twenty-Second international joint conference on Artificial Intelligence - Volume Volume One
The complexity of safe manipulation under scoring rules
IJCAI'11 Proceedings of the Twenty-Second international joint conference on Artificial Intelligence - Volume Volume One
Ties matter: complexity of voting manipulation revisited
IJCAI'11 Proceedings of the Twenty-Second international joint conference on Artificial Intelligence - Volume Volume Three
Manipulation under voting rule uncertainty
Proceedings of the 11th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 2
Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence
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The coalitional manipulation problem is one of the central problems in computational social choice. In this paper, we focus on solving the problem under the important family of positional scoring rules, in an approximate sense that was advocated by Zuckerman et al. [SODA 2008, AIJ 2009]. Our main result is a polynomial-time algorithm with (roughly speaking) the following theoretical guarantee: given a manipulable instance with m alternatives, the algorithm finds a successful manipulation with at most m - 2 additional manipulators. Our technique is based on a reduction to the scheduling problem known as Q|pmtn|Cmax, along with a novel rounding procedure. We demonstrate that our analysis is tight by establishing a new type of integrality gap. We also resolve a known open question in computational social choice by showing that the coalitional manipulation problem remains (strongly) NP-complete for positional scoring rules even when votes are unweighted. Finally, we discuss the implications of our results with respect to the question: "Is there a prominent voting rule that is usually hard to manipulate?"