The complexity of safe manipulation under scoring rules

Authors:
Egor Ianovski;Lan Yu;Edith Elkind;Mark C. Wilson
Affiliations:
Dept. of Computer Science, University of Auckland, New Zealand;School of Physical and Mathematical Sciences, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore;School of Physical and Mathematical Sciences, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore;Dept. of Computer Science, University of Auckland, New Zealand
Venue:
IJCAI'11 Proceedings of the Twenty-Second international joint conference on Artificial Intelligence - Volume Volume One
Year:
2011

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Abstract

[Slinko and White, 2008] have recently introduced a new model of coalitional manipulation of voting rules under limited communication, which they call safe strategic voting. The computational aspects of this model were first studied by [Hazon and Elkind, 2010], who provide polynomial-time algorithms for finding a safe strategic vote under k- approval and the Bucklin rule. In this paper, we answer an open question of [Hazon and Elkind, 2010] by presenting a polynomial-time algorithm for finding a safe strategic vote under the Borda rule. Our results for Borda generalize to several interesting classes of scoring rules.