Rank aggregation methods for the Web
Proceedings of the 10th international conference on World Wide Web
Journal of Computer and System Sciences
When are elections with few candidates hard to manipulate?
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
On the robustness of preference aggregation in noisy environments
Proceedings of the 6th international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems
Algorithms for the coalitional manipulation problem
Proceedings of the nineteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
Nonexistence of voting rules that are usually hard to manipulate
AAAI'06 Proceedings of the 21st national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
Llull and copeland voting broadly resist bribery and control
AAAI'07 Proceedings of the 22nd national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
Strongly decomposable voting rules on multiattribute domains
AAAI'07 Proceedings of the 22nd national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
Junta distributions and the average-case complexity of manipulating elections
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
Universal voting protocol tweaks to make manipulation hard
IJCAI'03 Proceedings of the 18th international joint conference on Artificial intelligence
Hybrid voting protocols and hardness of manipulation
ISAAC'05 Proceedings of the 16th international conference on Algorithms and Computation
Frequent Manipulability of Elections: The Case of Two Voters
WINE '08 Proceedings of the 4th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics
Llull and Copeland voting computationally resist bribery and constructive control
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
How hard is bribery in elections?
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
A multivariate complexity analysis of determining possible winners given incomplete votes
IJCAI'09 Proceedings of the 21st international jont conference on Artifical intelligence
Finite local consistency characterizes generalized scoring rules
IJCAI'09 Proceedings of the 21st international jont conference on Artifical intelligence
Complexity of unweighted coalitional manipulation under some common voting rules
IJCAI'09 Proceedings of the 21st international jont conference on Artifical intelligence
Manipulating Tournaments in Cup and Round Robin Competitions
ADT '09 Proceedings of the 1st International Conference on Algorithmic Decision Theory
A scheduling approach to coalitional manipulation
Proceedings of the 11th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Manipulation of copeland elections
Proceedings of the 9th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems: volume 1 - Volume 1
Towards a dichotomy for the Possible Winner problem in elections based on scoring rules
Journal of Computer and System Sciences
Complexity of safe strategic voting
SAGT'10 Proceedings of the Third international conference on Algorithmic game theory
Strategy-proof voting rules over multi-issue domains with restricted preferences
WINE'10 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Internet and network economics
Multimode control attacks on elections
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
Ties matter: complexity of voting manipulation revisited
The 10th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 1
Determining possible and necessary winners under common voting rules given partial orders
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
Is computational complexity a barrier to manipulation?
Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence
Taking the final step to a full dichotomy of the possible winner problem in pure scoring rules
Information Processing Letters
Where are the hard manipulation problems?
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
Multi-agent soft constraint aggregation via sequential voting
IJCAI'11 Proceedings of the Twenty-Second international joint conference on Artificial Intelligence - Volume Volume One
The complexity of safe manipulation under scoring rules
IJCAI'11 Proceedings of the Twenty-Second international joint conference on Artificial Intelligence - Volume Volume One
On the complexity of voting manipulation under randomized tie-breaking
IJCAI'11 Proceedings of the Twenty-Second international joint conference on Artificial Intelligence - Volume Volume One
Ties matter: complexity of voting manipulation revisited
IJCAI'11 Proceedings of the Twenty-Second international joint conference on Artificial Intelligence - Volume Volume Three
Manipulation under voting rule uncertainty
Proceedings of the 11th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 2
Proceedings of the 2013 international conference on Autonomous agents and multi-agent systems
The complexity of online manipulation of sequential elections
Journal of Computer and System Sciences
Bribery in voting with CP-nets
Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence
Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence
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We study the complexity of manipulation for a family of election systems derived from Copeland voting via introducing a parameter α that describes how ties in head-to-head contests are valued. We show that the thus obtained problem of manipulation for unweighted Copelandα elections is NP-complete even if the size of the manipulating coalition is limited to two. Our result holds for all rational values of α such that 0