Rank aggregation methods for the Web
Proceedings of the 10th international conference on World Wide Web
Complexity of manipulating elections with few candidates
Eighteenth national conference on Artificial intelligence
Vote elicitation: complexity and strategy-proofness
Eighteenth national conference on Artificial intelligence
How many candidates are needed to make elections hard to manipulate?
Proceedings of the 9th conference on Theoretical aspects of rationality and knowledge
Junta distributions and the average-case complexity of manipulating elections
AAMAS '06 Proceedings of the fifth international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems
Journal of Computer and System Sciences
Anyone but him: The complexity of precluding an alternative
Artificial Intelligence
On the robustness of preference aggregation in noisy environments
Proceedings of the 6th international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems
Nonexistence of voting rules that are usually hard to manipulate
AAAI'06 Proceedings of the 21st national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
The complexity of bribery in elections
AAAI'06 Proceedings of the 21st national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
Hybrid elections broaden complexity-theoretic resistance to control
IJCAI'07 Proceedings of the 20th international joint conference on Artifical intelligence
Multi-winner elections: complexity of manipulation, control, and winner-determination
IJCAI'07 Proceedings of the 20th international joint conference on Artifical intelligence
Universal voting protocol tweaks to make manipulation hard
IJCAI'03 Proceedings of the 18th international joint conference on Artificial intelligence
Small coalitions cannot manipulate voting
FC'05 Proceedings of the 9th international conference on Financial Cryptography and Data Security
Guarantees for the success frequency of an algorithm for finding dodgson-election winners
MFCS'06 Proceedings of the 31st international conference on Mathematical Foundations of Computer Science
Complexity of terminating preference elicitation
Proceedings of the 7th international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems - Volume 2
Proceedings of the 7th international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems - Volume 2
A broader picture of the complexity of strategic behavior in multi-winner elections
Proceedings of the 7th international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems - Volume 2
Proceedings of the 7th international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems - Volume 3
Copeland Voting Fully Resists Constructive Control
AAIM '08 Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Algorithmic Aspects in Information and Management
Sincere-Strategy Preference-Based Approval Voting Broadly Resists Control
MFCS '08 Proceedings of the 33rd international symposium on Mathematical Foundations of Computer Science
Parameterized Complexity of Candidate Control in Elections and Related Digraph Problems
COCOA 2008 Proceedings of the 2nd international conference on Combinatorial Optimization and Applications
Parameterized computational complexity of control problems in voting systems
Theoretical Computer Science
How similarity helps to efficiently compute Kemeny rankings
Proceedings of The 8th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 1
Proceedings of the 12th Conference on Theoretical Aspects of Rationality and Knowledge
Approximability of manipulating elections
AAAI'08 Proceedings of the 23rd national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
Complexity of strategic behavior in multi-winner elections
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
Fixed-parameter algorithms for Kemeny rankings
Theoretical Computer Science
Parameterized complexity of candidate control in elections and related digraph problems
Theoretical Computer Science
Llull and Copeland voting computationally resist bribery and constructive control
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
How hard is bribery in elections?
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
A multivariate complexity analysis of determining possible winners given incomplete votes
IJCAI'09 Proceedings of the 21st international jont conference on Artifical intelligence
How hard is it to control sequential elections via the agenda?
IJCAI'09 Proceedings of the 21st international jont conference on Artifical intelligence
Parameterized complexity of control problems in Maximin election
Information Processing Letters
Multimode control attacks on elections
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
Is computational complexity a barrier to manipulation?
Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence
Winner determination in voting trees with incomplete preferences and weighted votes
Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems
On the evaluation of election outcomes under uncertainty
Artificial Intelligence
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Control of elections refers to attempts by an agent to, via such actions as addition/deletion/partition of candidates or voters, ensure that a given candidate wins (Bartholdi, Tovey, & Trick 1992). An election system in which such an agent's computational task is NP-hard is said to be resistant to the given type of control. Aside from election systems with an NP-hard winner problem, the only systems known to be resistant to all the standard control types are highly artificial election systems created by hybridization (Hemaspaandra, Hemaspaandra, & Rothe 2007b). In this paper, we prove that an election system developed by the 13th century mystic Ramon Llull and the well-studied Copeland election system are both resistant to all the standard types of (constructive) electoral control other than one variant of addition of candidates. This is the most comprehensive resistance to control yet achieved by any natural election system whose winner problem is in P. In addition, we show that Llull and Copeland voting are very broadly resistant to bribery attacks, and we integrate the potential irrationality of voter preferences into many of our results.