Network flows: theory, algorithms, and applications
Network flows: theory, algorithms, and applications
Journal of Computer and System Sciences
When are elections with few candidates hard to manipulate?
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
Anyone but him: The complexity of precluding an alternative
Artificial Intelligence
Nonexistence of voting rules that are usually hard to manipulate
AAAI'06 Proceedings of the 21st national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
The complexity of bribery in elections
AAAI'06 Proceedings of the 21st national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
Llull and copeland voting broadly resist bribery and control
AAAI'07 Proceedings of the 22nd national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
Junta distributions and the average-case complexity of manipulating elections
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
Multi-winner elections: complexity of manipulation, control, and winner-determination
IJCAI'07 Proceedings of the 20th international joint conference on Artifical intelligence
Universal voting protocol tweaks to make manipulation hard
IJCAI'03 Proceedings of the 18th international joint conference on Artificial intelligence
Hybrid voting protocols and hardness of manipulation
ISAAC'05 Proceedings of the 16th international conference on Algorithms and Computation
Approximability of manipulating elections
AAAI'08 Proceedings of the 23rd national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
Llull and Copeland voting computationally resist bribery and constructive control
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
How hard is bribery in elections?
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
SAGT '09 Proceedings of the 2nd International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory
Using complexity to protect elections
Communications of the ACM
Towards a dichotomy for the Possible Winner problem in elections based on scoring rules
Journal of Computer and System Sciences
Approximation algorithms for campaign management
WINE'10 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Internet and network economics
Determining possible and necessary winners under common voting rules given partial orders
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
On the evaluation of election outcomes under uncertainty
Artificial Intelligence
Bribery in voting over combinatorial domains is easy
Proceedings of the 11th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 3
Studies in computational aspects of voting: open problems of downey and fellows
The Multivariate Algorithmic Revolution and Beyond
Bribery in voting with CP-nets
Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence
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We study the concept of bribery in the situation where voters are willing to change their votes as we ask them, but where their prices depend on the nature of the change we request. Our model is an extension of the one of Faliszewski et al. [9], where each voter has a single price for any change we may ask for. We show polynomial-time algorithms for our version of bribery for a broad range of voting protocols, including plurality, veto, approval, and utility-based voting. In addition we prove NP-completeness for a couple of our nonuniform bribery problems for weighted voters, and give approximation algorithms for two NP-complete bribery problems defined in [9].