Swap Bribery

Authors:
Edith Elkind;Piotr Faliszewski;Arkadii Slinko
Affiliations:
School of ECS, University of Southampton, UK and Division of Mathematical Sciences, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore;Dept. of Computer Science, AGH Univ. of Science and Technology, Kraków, Poland;Dept. of Mathematics, University of Auckland, New Zealand
Venue:
SAGT '09 Proceedings of the 2nd International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory
Year:
2009

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Abstract

In voting theory, bribery is a form of manipulative behavior in which an external actor (the briber) offers to pay the voters to change their votes in order to get her preferred candidate elected. We investigate a model of bribery where the price of each vote depends on the amount of change that the voter is asked to implement. Specifically, in our model the briber can change a voter's preference list by paying for a sequence of swaps of consecutive candidates. Each swap may have a different price; the price of a bribery is the sum of the prices of all swaps that it involves. We prove complexity results for this model, which we call swap bribery , for a broad class of voting rules, including variants of approval and k -approval, Borda, Copeland, and maximin.