Journal of Computer and System Sciences
When are elections with few candidates hard to manipulate?
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
Average-case tractability of manipulation in voting via the fraction of manipulators
Proceedings of the 6th international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems
Algorithms for the coalitional manipulation problem
Proceedings of the nineteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
Nonexistence of voting rules that are usually hard to manipulate
AAAI'06 Proceedings of the 21st national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 1
Junta distributions and the average-case complexity of manipulating elections
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
Universal voting protocol tweaks to make manipulation hard
IJCAI'03 Proceedings of the 18th international joint conference on Artificial intelligence
Hybrid voting protocols and hardness of manipulation
ISAAC'05 Proceedings of the 16th international conference on Algorithms and Computation
Frequent Manipulability of Elections: The Case of Two Voters
WINE '08 Proceedings of the 4th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics
The learnability of voting rules
Artificial Intelligence
On distance rationalizability of some voting rules
Proceedings of the 12th Conference on Theoretical Aspects of Rationality and Knowledge
Llull and Copeland voting computationally resist bribery and constructive control
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
Preference functions that score rankings and maximum likelihood estimation
IJCAI'09 Proceedings of the 21st international jont conference on Artifical intelligence
Multimode control attacks on elections
IJCAI'09 Proceedings of the 21st international jont conference on Artifical intelligence
Where are the really hard manipulation problems? the phase transition in manipulating the veto rule
IJCAI'09 Proceedings of the 21st international jont conference on Artifical intelligence
Finite local consistency characterizes generalized scoring rules
IJCAI'09 Proceedings of the 21st international jont conference on Artifical intelligence
Complexity of unweighted coalitional manipulation under some common voting rules
IJCAI'09 Proceedings of the 21st international jont conference on Artifical intelligence
SAGT '09 Proceedings of the 2nd International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory
Truthful and Quality Conscious Query Incentive Networks
WINE '09 Proceedings of the 5th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics
A scheduling approach to coalitional manipulation
Proceedings of the 11th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Using complexity to protect elections
Communications of the ACM
An Empirical Study of the Manipulability of Single Transferable Voting
Proceedings of the 2010 conference on ECAI 2010: 19th European Conference on Artificial Intelligence
Comparing multiagent systems research in combinatorial auctions and voting
Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence
Information and Computation
Manipulation complexity and gender neutrality in stable marriage procedures
Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems
Strategy-proof voting rules over multi-issue domains with restricted preferences
WINE'10 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Internet and network economics
Multimode control attacks on elections
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
An algorithm for the coalitional manipulation problem under Maximin
The 10th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 2
A Quantitative Version of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem for Three Alternatives
SIAM Journal on Computing
Is computational complexity a barrier to manipulation?
Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence
Where are the hard manipulation problems?
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
Optimal social choice functions: a utilitarian view
Proceedings of the 13th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce
Computing the margin of victory for various voting rules
Proceedings of the 13th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce
Unweighted coalitional manipulation under the Borda rule Is NP-hard
IJCAI'11 Proceedings of the Twenty-Second international joint conference on Artificial Intelligence - Volume Volume One
A maximum likelihood approach towards aggregating partial orders
IJCAI'11 Proceedings of the Twenty-Second international joint conference on Artificial Intelligence - Volume Volume One
On coalitions and stable winners in plurality
WINE'12 Proceedings of the 8th international conference on Internet and Network Economics
When do noisy votes reveal the truth?
Proceedings of the fourteenth ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Designing social choice mechanisms using machine learning
Proceedings of the 2013 international conference on Autonomous agents and multi-agent systems
Generalized scoring rules: a framework that reconciles Borda and Condorcet
ACM SIGecom Exchanges
Normalized Range Voting Broadly Resists Control
Theory of Computing Systems
Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence
A smooth transition from powerlessness to absolute power
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
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We introduce a class of voting rules called generalized scoring rules. Under such a rule, each vote generates a vector of k scores, and the outcome of the voting rule is based only on the sum of these vectors---more specifically, only on the order (in terms of score) of the sum's components. This class is extremely general: we do not know of any commonly studied rule that is not a generalized scoring rule. We then study the coalitional manipulation problem for generalized scoring rules. We prove that under certain natural assumptions, if the number of manipulators is O(np) (for any pO(np--1/2), where n is the number of voters. We also prove that under another set of natural assumptions, if the number of manipulators is Ω(np) (for any p 1/2) and o(n), then the probability that a random profile is manipulable (to any possible winner under the voting rule) is 1--O(e--Ω(n2p--1)). We also show that common voting rules satisfy these conditions (for the uniform distribution). These results generalize earlier results by Procaccia and Rosenschein as well as even earlier results on the probability of an election being tied.