A Fourier-theoretic perspective on the Condorcet paradox and Arrow's theorem
Advances in Applied Mathematics
Average-case tractability of manipulation in voting via the fraction of manipulators
Proceedings of the 6th international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems
Generalized scoring rules and the frequency of coalitional manipulability
Proceedings of the 9th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Equilibria of plurality voting with abstentions
Proceedings of the 11th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
A quantitative gibbard-satterthwaite theorem without neutrality
STOC '12 Proceedings of the forty-fourth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Computing the margin of victory for various voting rules
Proceedings of the 13th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce
Stability scores: measuring coalitional stability
Proceedings of the 11th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 2
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We consider elections under the Plurality rule, where all voters are assumed to act strategically. As there are typically many Nash equilibria for every preference profile, and strong equilibria do not always exist, we analyze the most stable outcomes according to their stability scores (the number of coalitions with an interest to deviate). We show a tight connection between the Maximin score of a candidate and the highest stability score of the outcomes where this candidate wins, and show that under mild conditions the Maximin winner will also be the winner in the most stable outcome under Plurality.