Failures of the VCG mechanism in combinatorial auctions and exchanges
AAMAS '06 Proceedings of the fifth international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems
SODA '07 Proceedings of the eighteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
User modeling in position auctions: re-considering the GSP and VCG mechanisms
Proceedings of The 8th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 1
Computational analysis of perfect-information position auctions
Proceedings of the 10th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
SAGT '09 Proceedings of the 2nd International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory
Honor among thieves: collusion in multi-unit auctions
Proceedings of the 9th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems: volume 1 - Volume 1
Subsidies, stability, and restricted cooperation in coalitional games
IJCAI'11 Proceedings of the Twenty-Second international joint conference on Artificial Intelligence - Volume Volume One
On coalitions and stable winners in plurality
WINE'12 Proceedings of the 8th international conference on Internet and Network Economics
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We introduce a measure for the level of stability against coalitional deviations, called stability scores, which generalizes widely used notions of stability in non-cooperative games. We use the proposed measure to compare various Nash equilibria in congestion games, and to quantify the effect of game parameters on coalitional stability. For our main results, we apply stability scores to analyze and compare the Generalized Second Price (GSP) and Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) ad auctions. We show that while a central result of the ad auctions literature is that the GSP and VCG auctions implement the same outcome in one of the equilibria of GSP, the GSP outcome is far more stable. Finally, a modified version of VCG is introduced, which is group strategy-proof, and thereby achieves the highest possible stability score.