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The Price of Stability for Network Design with Fair Cost Allocation
FOCS '04 Proceedings of the 45th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
The price of selfish behavior in bilateral network formation
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On nash equilibria for a network creation game
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Convergence time to Nash equilibria
ICALP'03 Proceedings of the 30th international conference on Automata, languages and programming
Strong equilibrium in cost sharing connection games
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On the value of coordination in network design
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Approximate Strong Equilibrium in Job Scheduling Games
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The Price of Stochastic Anarchy
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SODA '09 Proceedings of the twentieth Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms
Network Creation Games with Disconnected Equilibria
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The Power of Small Coalitions in Cost Sharing
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Strong and Pareto Price of Anarchy in Congestion Games
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M-DPOP: faithful distributed implementation of efficient social choice problems
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GameNets'09 Proceedings of the First ICST international conference on Game Theory for Networks
SAGT '09 Proceedings of the 2nd International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory
On Equilibria for ADM Minimization Games
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Parametric Packing of Selfish Items and the Subset Sum Algorithm
WINE '09 Proceedings of the 5th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics
Selfish Scheduling with Setup Times
WINE '09 Proceedings of the 5th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics
On Strong Equilibria in the Max Cut Game
WINE '09 Proceedings of the 5th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics
A dynamic random access game with energy constraints
WiOPT'09 Proceedings of the 7th international conference on Modeling and Optimization in Mobile, Ad Hoc, and Wireless Networks
Approximate strong equilibrium in job scheduling games
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A network creation game with nonuniform interests
WINE'07 Proceedings of the 3rd international conference on Internet and network economics
WINE'07 Proceedings of the 3rd international conference on Internet and network economics
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Coalition formation and price of anarchy in cournot oligopolies
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The price of anarchy in cooperative network creation games
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On a bounded budget network creation game
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Collusion in atomic splittable routing games
ICALP'11 Proceedings of the 38th international conference on Automata, languages and programming - Volume Part II
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Survey: Robust and scalable middleware for selfish-computer systems
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Stability scores: measuring coalitional stability
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Strong price of anarchy for machine load balancing
ICALP'07 Proceedings of the 34th international conference on Automata, Languages and Programming
Capacitated network design games
SAGT'12 Proceedings of the 5th international conference on Algorithmic Game Theory
Future Generation Computer Systems
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A strong equilibrium (Aumann 1959) is a pure Nash equilibrium which is resilient to deviations by coalitions. We define the strong price of anarchy to be the ratio of the worst case strong equilibrium to the social optimum. In contrast to the traditional price of anarchy, which quantifies the loss incurred due to both selfishness and lack of coordination, the strong price of anarchy isolates the loss originated from selfishness from that obtained due to lack of coordination. We study the strong price of anarchy in two settings, one of job scheduling and the other of network creation. In the job scheduling game we show that for unrelated machines the strong price of anarchy can be bounded as a function of the number of machines and the size of the coalition. For the network creation game we show that the strong price of anarchy is at most 2. In both cases we show that a strong equilibrium always exists, except for a well defined subset of network creation games.